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Introduction 
The International Space Station (ISS) can be considered one of the structural engineering wonders of the 
world. On par with the World Trade Center, the Colossus of Rhodes, the Statue of Liberty, the Great 
Pyramids, the Petronas towers and the Burj Khalifa skyscraper of Dubai, the ambition and scope of the 
ISS structural design, verification and assembly effort is a truly global success story. With its on-orbit life 
projected to be from its beginning in 1998 to the year 2020 (and perhaps beyond), all of those who 
participated in its development can consider themselves part of an historic engineering achievement 
representing all of humanity. 
The structural design and verification of the ISS could be the subject of many scholarly papers. Several 
papers have been written on the structural dynamic characterization of the ISS once it was assembled 
on-orbit [1], but the ground-based activities required to assure structural integrity and structural life of 
the individual elements from delivery to orbit through assembly and planned on-orbit operations have 
never been totally summarized. This paper is intended to give the reader an overview of some of the key 
decisions made during the structural verification planning for the elements of the U.S. On-Orbit Segment 
(USOS) as well as to summarize the many structural tests and structural analyses that were performed 
on its major elements. An effort is made for this paper to be summarily comprehensive, but as with all 
knowledge capture efforts of this kind, there are bound to be errors of omission. Should the reader 
discover any of these, please feel free to contact the principal author. 
The ISS (Figure 1) is composed of pre-integrated truss segments and pressurized elements supplied by 
NASA, the Russian Federal Space Agency (RSA), the European Space Agency (ESA) and the Japanese 
Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA). Each of these elements was delivered to orbit by a launch vehicle 
and connected to one another either robotically or autonomously. The primary structure of each 
element was assembled and verified by teams of responsible structural engineers within and among  
their respective agencies and agency contractors. This paper is primarily focused on the structural 
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20110013394 2019-08-30T16:08:57+00:00Z
2 
 
verification of the NASA-provided elements of the ISS, since that was the principal author’s primary 
responsibility and area of knowledge. Where joint structural verification activities were performed 
between NASA and an International Partner, these activities will be summarized. It is left to the various 
International Partners to publish detailed accounts of the structural verification efforts for their 
particular contributions to the ISS. 
 
Figure 1 – The International Space Station (ISS) as seen during the fly-around of the Space Shuttle 
Atlantis (OV-104) during the STS-132 mission in May, 2010. 
Summary of ISS Structural Verification 
In all human endeavors, both budget and schedule constraints must be accommodated while still 
producing the required work needed for the project to be successful. The structural verification effort 
for the ISS elements was no exception. At the inception of the ISS Program, many elements of the Space 
Station Freedom Program had progressed through their Critical Design Reviews.  Others Space Station 
Freedom hardware was repackaged to accommodate the new assembly sequence which included two 
early Russian elements, the Functional Cargo Block (FGB) (later named “Zarya”) and the Service Module 
(later named “Zvezda”). During the ISS Program definition phase, the structural verification testing of 
the USOS elements was “zero-baselined”, requiring the principal author and his team to justify to ISS 
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Program Management the need for each individual structural test.  This section summarizes the overall 
structural verification philosophy and the baseline structural verification activities for the USOS 
elements of the ISS which emerged from that process. 
 
Structural Verification Philosophy 
The structural integrity of ISS elements during delivery to orbit by the Space Shuttle Orbiter was a 
safety-of-flight concern. Structural failure of an ISS element in the payload bay of the Orbiter would be a 
potential catastrophic hazard to the vehicle and crew. Once delivered to orbit, the pressurized modules 
would be subjected for decades to internal pressure while both the modules and the integrated truss 
segments would be subjected to on-orbit transient dynamic loads such as docking events, plume 
impingement, EVA-induced loads and crew exercise. Any structural failure on-orbit could potentially be 
catastrophic or at the very least would be difficult to repair. With limited on-orbit structural inspection 
and repair capability, the structural verification approach prior to launch would have to encompass 
certification of each element for all of the anticipated loading events for its entire service life. 
The governing structural requirements documents for the ISS elements were SSP 30558, “Fracture 
Control Requirements for Space Station”,  SSP 30559, “Structural Design and Verification Requirements 
for Space Station” and SSP 30560, “Glass, Window and Ceramic Structural Design Requirements for 
Space Station”. These documents were authored by Mr. Orvis E. Pigg/NASA-JSC (retired) during the 
Space Station Freedom Program and provided the indispensible foundation for development of all of the 
USOS structures. These documents defined the required tests and analyses for structurally certifying the 
ISS elements and referenced Space Shuttle requirement documents NSTS 14046, “Payload Verification 
Requirements” and NSTS-21000-IDD-ISS, “International Space Station Interface Definition Document.” 
These requirements were flowed to the individual ISS element Prime Item Development Specifications 
and were addressed in the respective structural verification plans. These plans were negotiated with 
each hardware developer, the Space Shuttle Program and the ISS Program Office Structures and 
Mechanical Systems Team. 
Typically, each major payload that flies in the Orbiter and is attached to both the longeron and keel 
locations of the payload bay (“full-bay payloads”) requires a static test, a modal test and an acoustic test 
to structurally certify the payload for the environments it will experience during delivery to orbit. These 
test requirements can be tailored for individual payloads, but doing so requires detailed technical 
rationale which must be approved as an acceptance of risk from all of the stakeholders. Also, since the 
elements of the ISS would withstand on-orbit loads at locations other than the interfaces that are 
loaded during launch, dedicated on-orbit loads testing was performed on areas of the ISS elements and 
major subcomponents where on-orbit loads were critical. In developing the structural verification 
approach for the USOS elements, there were several areas where technical risk was accepted and 
structural testing was not performed, with appropriate rationale, in order to reduce overall Program 
cost and schedule. 
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Structural analysis of each ISS payload element was performed to the indentured part level. SSP 30559 
provided the requirements for factors of safety as well as structural analysis methodologies to be used 
in the certification stress analysis. Each part on the indentured parts list had a structural margin on both 
yield and ultimate strength written against it or was classified as “non-structural” or “good-by-
inspection.” This assured that a responsible stress analyst assessed every part of the element for 
structural integrity. SSP 30558 required that each part receive a fracture control classification and 
specified the requirements for hardware deemed “fracture critical”, where failure of the part could 
result in a catastrophic hazard. A Fracture Control Summary Report for each ISS element was prepared 
to document the results of this process. Structural life analysis and the verification of the ISS windows to 
SSP 30560 are discussed in subsequent sections. 
Pressurized Element Structural Verification 
“Unity” Node 
The “Unity” Node, “Destiny” Laboratory and “Quest” Airlock were manufactured and tested by The 
Boeing Company, Space Systems Division in Huntsville, Alabama with contributions of major structural 
components from McDonnell-Douglas Astronautics Company, Grumman Aerospace Corporation and 
Corning, Incorporated. The pressure shells of each module consisted of Aluminum 2219 barrel and 
endcone segments made from stretch-formed panels, joined by circumferential ring frames machined 
from Aluminum 2219 forgings (Figure 2). The radial and axial ports were Electron Beam-Welded 
Aluminum 2219 assemblies provided by Grumman Aerospace (Figure 3). The major longitudinal and 
radial welds were performed in Huntsville using Variable Polarity Plasma Arc (VPPA) Welding (Figures 4 
& 5). A Horizontal Boring Mill was used after each module pressure shell was welded to drill all of the 
penetrations for feedthroughs in the pressure shell. The window in the U.S. Laboratory was made from 
fused silica glass and the hatch windows were made of Chemcor, both provided by Corning, Inc.  
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Figure 2 – Node 1 pressure shell structural components. 
 
Figure 3 – Radial Port assembly supplied by Grumman Aerospace. 
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Figures 4 – VPPA Welding of the Node 1 pressure shell at The Boeing Company, Huntsville, AL. 
 
Figures 5 –Overview of welding fixture at The Boeing Company, Huntsville, AL. 
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Two Node structures were fabricated, the Node Structural Test Article (STA) and Node 1 flight article 
(later renamed “Unity”). During the welding process for the Node STA pressure shell, mismatch between 
adjacent welded sections occurred due to the heat input from the VPPA process and the differences in 
stiffness between the parts to be welded and the fixtures used to support them in the welding tool. 
Initially, a dual-pass VPPA weld schedule was employed, but it was found that this schedule input too 
much heat into the local area where the parts were joined. The weld schedule was re-defined as a single 
pass weld-schedule and detailed structural-thermal finite element models were created to predict the 
residual weld mismatch after joining. The tooling stiffness and fixity of the two parts with respect to one 
another was increased. After the parts were manufactured, stress analysis was performed on the as-
built node configuration to define allowable weld mismatch for the Aluminum 2219 parts to show 
positive margins of safety (Figures 6, 7 and 8) [2]. This analysis process and weld mismatch 
characterization was performed for all of the pressurized elements built in Huntsville, but as more 
modules were fabricated by the same manufacturing team, weld mismatches became smaller and 
localized weld stresses due to mismatch became less of a concern. 
Fracture analysis of the pressure shell welds was performed to assure that the Node met Leak Before 
Burst criteria as defined in SSP 30558. This analysis was based on crack detection probability studies 
performed on welded coupons of Aluminum 2219-T87 using X-ray inspection. Residual stresses and 
weld mismatch effects were taken into account in the fracture analysis. A summary of this process is 
provided in Figures 9 and 10 [3]. This analysis was also performed on all of the other pressurized 
elements. 
 
Figure 6 – Allowable data for Aluminum 2219 as a function of weld mismatch. 
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Figure 7 – Structural Analysis of mismatched welds on Node 1. 
 
Figure 8 – Allowable weld mismatch on Node 1 by region. 
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Figure 9 – Leak Before Burst analysis process for the pressurized element welds. 
 
Figure 10 – Weld residual stress analysis process for the pressurized element welds. 
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As originally conceived, the Node and Laboratory module structures were to be certified using dedicated 
structural test articles. These dedicated test articles would subsequently be refurbished to become flight 
articles themselves later in the program. As part of the ISS Program baseline, the Airlock was planned to 
be a protoflight structure to save cost . Therefore, the formulation of the structural test program for 
these elements required that no ultimate loads testing be performed on any of this hardware and that 
test loads applied to these elements induce no permanent detrimental deformation. The pressurized 
elements were designed to a factor of safety of 2.0 x MDP on ultimate, 1.65 x MDP on yield and 1.5 x 
(pressure + mechanical) loads on ultimate and 1.1 x (pressure + mechanical) loads on yield per SSP 
30559. 
The unique structural verification requirements for Node 1 were driven by its six berthing ports (two 
axial ports and four radial ports). During launch, the Node 1 would support a Pressurized Mating 
Adapter (PMA - provided by The Boeing Company, Huntington Beach) from each axial port (Figure 11). 
Node 1 would interface with the Russian FGB through a PMA attached to its aft axial port (Figure 12) as 
well as with the U.S. Laboratory attached to its forward axial port. At the time of Node 1’s structural 
verification (1996-1997), its structural design was identical to that of Node 2, so the Node Structural Test 
Article’s radial and axial ports would have to be tested to loads which enveloped the anticipated loads 
for both Node 1 and Node 2. The axial port mechanical loads were driven by the mechanical loads 
imparted through the Node 1’s aft axial port where it interfaced through PMA-1 to the Russian 
Functional Cargo Block early in the ISS assembly sequence after the FGB Service Module and Node 1 
were attached together (a Progress docking to the aft port of the Service Module while the ISS was a 
relatively low mass vehicle produced a significant dynamic response). The radial port loads were 
predicted to be highest for Node 2 when both the Japanese Experiment Module and the Centrifuge 
Module were attached to adjacent radial ports and subjected to the transient dynamic loads during a 
Progress vehicle docking. The structural test loads for the Node (STA) axial and radial ports were derived 
from these particular load cases. So, the Node STA testing was based on a combination of load cases 
from both Node 1 and Node 2. 
The first test performed on the Node STA was a proof pressure test to 1.5 times its maximum design 
pressure, which for ISS was calculated to be 22.8 pounds per square inch differential (psid). (Maximum 
Design Pressure (MDP) is calculated assuming two failures within the pressure control system. In other 
words, the pressurized system must be two-failure tolerant against exceeding the MDP of the 
hardware.) The test included the Node STA pressure shell, all internal secondary structure as well as 
pressure domes attached to the zenith radial port Common Berthing Mechanism (CBM) and the aft axial 
port CBM (Figure 13) [4].  
Proof pressure tests of habitable modules,  which are intended to verify workmanship and pressure 
integrity, are not generally used to screen for flaws. To find flaws,  Non-Destructive Evaluation (NDE) 
was performed on all Node STA welds prior to the test. This is NDE included X-Ray and ultrasonic 
inspections. The proof pressure tests of both the Node STA and the Node 1 flight article were performed 
at the George C. Marshall Space Flight Center in Huntsville, Alabama. 
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 Despite the care that was taken  in manufacturing and assembling both the Node 1 and Node STA flight 
hardware, including pre-test hatch window inspections by KSC personnel and a detailed review of 
analyses and build paperwork, the team was concerned about certain parts of the Node structure. The 
proof pressure test was required to assure the overall structural integrity, stress and strain behavior at 
pressure shell welds and in the skin, ovality and planarity of the CBM interfaces. Several manufacturing 
incidents occurred during the Node STA assembly which further reinforced the need for a proof pressure 
test.  A radial port hatch was inadvertently dropped inside the Node STA. An incident occurred on the 
Horizontal Boring Mill in Huntsville where the Node 1 was inadvertently bumped by the tooling used to 
drill holes in the pressure shell for feedthrough penetrations. High strains were predicted in four gussets 
on each radial port of both the Node STA and Node 1 flight article during pre-test analysis for the proof 
pressure test. So, the proof pressure testing of each Node was an important first milestone of the ISS 
structures development effort.  
 
Figure 11 – “Unity” Node in the Orbiter Payload Bay. PMA-2 is forward in the bay, PMA-1 is aft in the 
bay.  
Forward 
end of 
Shuttle 
Payload 
Bay 
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Figure 12 – The nascent ISS - “Unity” Node attached to “Zarya” through PMA-1. 
The Node STA proof pressure test demonstrated that the team’s concern about high strain in some 
gussets were valid. The proof pressure test of the Node STA only achieved 20 psid due to high strains 
and creep in four gussets stiffening each of the four radial ports (Figures 14 through 18)[5]. The Node 1 
Flight Article was pressure tested a few days later in a nearby facility on the Redstone Arsenal and this 
article only achieved 18 psid due to high strains and creep in the gussets and asymmetric deflections of 
the pressure shell. The Node 1 Flight Article configuration was different from the Node STA; it consisted 
only of the pressure shell, CBM’s and hatches with no internal secondary structure or external pressure 
domes. 
Investigation of these anomalous test results led to the removal of the gussets from both the Node 1 
and the Node STA radial ports and the installation of certain common elements of internal secondary 
structure (two endcone truss and four sets of radial port standoff beams) within each Node which 
helped react the pressure loads throughout the shell (Figures 19, 20 and 21) [6]. Also, a pair of struts 
was added between each adjacent pair of radial ports, ostensibly to off-load the gussets, but once the 
gussets were removed, these struts served to distribute the pressure and mechanical loads more evenly 
between adjacent radial ports and to limit the deflections at the surface of the radial port Active 
Common Berthing Mechanism (CBM) ring (Figures 22 and 23) [7]. 
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Figure 13 – Diagram of Node STA Proof Pressure and Leak Rate Test Setup. 
 
Figure 14 – Node 1/Node STA Radial Port gussets. 
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Figure 15 - Instrumentation on Node STA Radial Port gussets for proof pressure test. 
 
Figure 16 – Strain gage readings on Nadir radial port gussets during Node STA proof pressure test. 
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Figure 17 – Detailed finite element model of Node radial port gusset. 
 
Figure 18 – Node 1 and Node STA gusset strain proof pressure test comparisons. 
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Figure 19 – Cutaway view of Node 1 internal secondary structure. 
 
Figure 20 – Node secondary structure reacting pressure loads. 
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Figure 21 – Node secondary structure reacting pressure loads. 
 
Figure 22 – Internal strut installation on Node STA and Node 1. 
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Figure 23 – Node Radial Port Strut Structural analysis. 
Subsequent to these modifications, both the Node 1 and the Node STA internal volumes were 
successfully proof tested to 22.8 psid. One pressure dome was attached to the zenith radial port and 
another pressure dome was attached to an axial port. After 22.8 psid was achieved, pressure 
equalization valves were opened between the Node internal volume and each of the domes in order to 
proof test the vestibule formed by the attachment of an adjacent pressurized element to each port. The 
initial configuration of the CBMs at these two port locations had all 16 motorized bolts engaged. After 
the 16-bolt proof pressure test was completed, the highest loaded motorized bolt was backed off so 
that both structural and pressure integrity could be demonstrated with 15 of 16 bolts engaged (Figure 
24) [8]. These tests were also successful. However, at the end of this test sequence on the Node STA, 
which took nearly 20 hours to complete, a circuit breaker tripped causing an emergency venting of the 
Node STA during the final stages of depressurization. This trip was due to overloading of a power strip 
within the test set-up. This venting, had it occurred earlier in the test sequence when the vestibule 
volume was still pressurized, could have caused significant damage to the test article.  
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Figure 24 – Node STA / Node 1 Proof Pressure / Leak Rate Test Sequence. 
 Strain gages located across the Node STA and Node 1 pressure shell and on aluminum plates installed in 
both a radial and an axial hatch window provided stress distributions and internal loads at critical 
features such as areas of weld mismatch and endcone to cylinder interfaces. Deflection gages monitored 
overall displacement of both the pressure shell and the CBM rings.  Subsequent post-proof NDE and 
helium leak testing of the welds confirmed the pressure and leakage integrity of the article. Since most 
of the ISS structures were tested in facilities without tight temperature controls, temperature-
compensation of the strain gage readings had to be performed. While this induced error was small, this 
consideration cannot be overlooked when performing qualification testing for structures when tight 
math model correlation is required. All stated objectives of the Node 1 and Node STA proof pressure 
and leak test campaign were satisfied (Figure 25) [9]. 
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Figure 25– Node STA Proof Pressure / Leak Rate Test Objectives. 
Following  the proof pressure test program, the Node STA was moved to its static test fixture in Building 
4619 at MSFC where both pressure and mechanical loads could be applied simultaneously to complete 
the structural verification testing (Figure 26)[10]. Pressure domes were mounted over one axial port and 
one radial port. Load fixtures could apply bending loads to the axial port singularly and to two adjacent 
radial ports simultaneously, with one adjacent radial port containing the pressure dome and the other 
adjacent radial port remaining unpressurized. This test sequence was intended to exercise the Node STA 
structure to 1.05 times the combined (pressure + mechanical) loads. This test value was agreed upon 
based on the conservative envelope of the specified transient dynamic interface loads on the radial 
ports (Figure 27 – 29) [11]. 
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Figure 26 – Structural Test Fixture located in Building 4619 at MSFC. 
 
Figure 27 – Rationale for Node STA Combined Loads Test Factor. 
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Figure 28 – Rationale for Node STA combined loads test factor. 
 
Figure 29 –Historical data supporting the rationale for the Node STA combined loads test factor. 
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Static Influence coefficient characterization testing was performed to exercise the ports prior to the 
actual static test campaign. Both the axial port and the two adjacent radial port 1.05 times combined 
(pressure + mechanical) loads test cases were completed successfully. The axial port combined loads 
case was also used to assure that the PMAs could be successfully delivered to orbit attached to both the 
forward and aft axial ports without buckling the Node endcones. In addition to the on-orbit loads 
testing, the static test fixture was used to certify the Node for launch loads in the Space Shuttle Orbiter. 
Multiple load cases exercised the four longeron and single keel trunnion to loads which enveloped the 
liftoff, landing, emergency landing and Orbiter-to-payload relative deflection load cases that the Node 1 
would be subjected to during launch. The Orbiter static load tests were to 1.2 x limit load. The Node 
structure was design to 1.25 x the design limit load on yield for Orbiter load cases so no detrimental 
permanent deformation was incurred during this testing. All static test cases for Orbiter-induced loads 
were successfully completed. A summary of the structural testing is provided in Figures 30 - 42 [12]. 
Node static test conditions 14 and 15 were deleted after detailed structural analysis showed that these 
conditions were not value-added (Figures 43 – 45) [13]. The global finite element model is shown in 
Figure 46[14]. 
 
Figure 30 – Overview of planned Nodes STA Static Test Campaign (Identifier # 14 – Rack Fitting and 
Identifier # 15 – Midbay Fitting were eventually deleted). 
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Figure 31- Condition 9A, B & C and Endcone Stiffness. 
 
Figure 32 – Condition 1, Aft Trunnion Loads and Torsional Stiffness. 
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Figure 33 – Condition 3, Forward Trunnion Roll. 
 
Figure 34 – Condition 2, Forward Trunnion, Keel and Aft Endcone Loads. 
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Figure 35 – Condition 14, Rack Fitting Load Case (Subsequently Deleted). 
 
Figure 36 – Condition 10A, Radial Port Influence Coefficient Test. 
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Figure 37 – Condition 10B, Radial Port Influence Coefficient Test. 
 
Figure 38 – Condition 10C, Radial Port Influence Coefficient Test. 
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Figure 39 – Condition 11A, CBM/CBM interface loads without pressure. 
 
Figure 40 – Condition 11B, CBM/CBM Interface loads with pressure. 
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Figure 41 – Condition 12, 1.05 times (pressure + mechanical) Radial Port Qualification Test. 
 
Figure 42 – Condition 15, Midbay Fitting Test (subsequently deleted). 
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Figure 43 – Memo justifying the cancellation of Node internal secondary structure testing. 
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Figure 44 – Supporting data for cancellation of node internal secondary structure tests. 
 
Figure 45 – Supporting data for cancellation of node internal secondary structure tests. 
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Figure 46 – Node STA Global Finite Element Model. 
 
The Node 1 STA was then lifted from its static test fixture and moved to the adjacent Space Shuttle 
Payload Modal Test Bed in Building 4619 (Figures 47 [15] and 48 [16]. During this operation, the facility 
crane stalled, leaving the Node STA hanging twenty feet in the air over the modal test fixture. The crane 
was fixed the next morning and it was determined that this prolonged hang load did not cause any 
damage to the test article. For the modal test, a 3200 lb mass/c.g. simulator was attached to both the 
forward and aft axial ports of the Node STA to represent the PMAs which would be attached to the 
Node 1 for launch in the Orbiter. A full modal test campaign including sine sweep and driving-point 
impedance testing on one axial and one radial port was undertaken in order to provide a verified Craig-
Bampton-reduced model to both the Shuttle Program for verification coupled loads analysis of the ride 
to orbit and to the ISS Program for incorporation into the integrated ISS dynamic model used for on-
orbit loads development. Pre-test predictions for the launch configuration (Figure 49) [17] and the 
configuration of the Node berthed to the Orbiter Docking System (Figure 50) [18] were performed and 
correlated with the modal test results. An excellent detailed discussion of the modal testing of the ISS 
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elements is provided in the paper “Modal Testing of Seven Shuttle Cargo Elements for Space Station” by 
K. Kappus, T. Driskill and R. Parks [19]. 
Correlation between the mathematical stress model and the test results were generally within 10% for 
critical strain and deflection readings. Dynamic models provided for Shuttle Verification Loads Analysis 
were expected to include all cargo element modes up to 50 Hz and where significantly large Orbital 
Replacement Units (ORUs) contributed to the dynamic response of the cargo element, correlation of the 
dynamic response of these components could be required up to 70 Hz. Static and dynamic verification 
test plans and correlated math models were reviewed by the Shuttle Structures Working Group as well 
as the ISS Structures & Loads teams before the hardware would be considered certified to fly in the 
Orbiter payload bay or be verified as an element of the on-orbit ISS configuration.  
 
Figure 47 – Node STA with PMA mass simulators on each end installed in the Modal Test Bed. 
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Figure 48 – Schematic of Space Shuttle Modal Test Bed at MSFC. 
 
Figure 49 – Sample pre-test prediction of a mode shape for launch of the Node in the Orbiter with the 
two PMA’s attached. 
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Figure 50 – Sample pre-test prediction of a mode shape for the configuration of the Node with both 
PMA’s attached mated to the ODS. 
A subsequent decision by the ISS Program to have Node 2 and Node 3 provided by Alenia Aerospazio 
obviated the need to refurbish the Node STA for flight. A new structural test campaign was required for 
Node 2/3 since this hardware would be a different structural configuration than Node 1. (The Node 2/3 
test campaign is described in a subsequent section.) Recently, there has been consideration to refurbish 
the Node STA for future launch to ISS. A feasibility study is underway to determine how this might be 
accomplished as the launch vehicle will not be the Space Shuttle. 
A critical issue to be addressed was the lack of full-scale acoustic testing on the USOS pressurized 
elements. During the ISS Program rebaselining activity, it was discovered that developing a full-scale, 
acoustic test capability near MSFC would be cost-prohibitive (Figure 51) [20]. Other acoustic test 
facilities existed, but the cost and schedule impacts for shipping the Node STA, Common Module STA 
and the Airlock protoflight article to a distant facility and performing the testing were also perceived to 
be excessive. All ISS elements were required to be certified to the 141 dB Overall Average Sound 
Pressure Level environment inside the Orbiter Payload Bay (Figure 52) [21], so a technically acceptable 
compromise had to be developed. 
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Figure 51 – Decision Package deleting Lab module vibroacoustic test from the ISS Program baseline. 
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Figure 52 – Orbiter combined liftoff / boost acoustic spectrum from NSTS 21000-IDD-ISS. 
The certification approach finally taken for the ISS pressurized elements to the Orbiter acoustic 
environment was heavily leveraged on the Spacelab, Multi-Purpose Logistics Module (MPLM), Shuttle 
and Saturn acoustic test data.  From these tests, internal random vibration environments were derived, 
providing the design criteria for internal rack mounted equipment within the USOS pressurized 
elements.  (Reference: Boeing HSV Memo 2-8V63-BLE-033/99, “Airlock Vibroacoustic Environment 
Verification, 9/1/99 and Boeing Memo 270-400-97-100, “ISS PG-3 Random Vibration Environments”, 
12/15/97.) For all externally-mounted equipment, component level acoustic or random vibration 
testing, as appropriate, was performed to assure that the hardware would not pose a catastrophic 
hazard to the Space Shuttle Orbiter during ascent. Examples of component level testing included an 
acoustic test of the Micro-Meteoroid/Orbital Debris (MM/OD) shielding and pressurized element 
common hatch as well as component random vibration tests of the U.S. Lab Window and Common 
Berthing Mechanism (CBM) components.  
Just prior to the launch of Node 1, the vendor that provided the ring forgings for the pressurized 
elements sent out a written notice that the temperature readings in the facility used to produce these 
forgings might not have been accurate. Therefore, the mechanical properties of the forgings might not 
have been per the vendor specification, invalidating the structural analysis and margins that had been 
calculated for the Node, Lab and Airlock primary structure. Fortunately, SSP 30233, “Space Station 
Requirements for Materials and Processes” required a first article cut-up of hardware delivered by the 
vendor to examine the overall condition of the forging as well as mechanical properties testing  of tabs 
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from each forging produced (Figure 53)[22]. An “A”-basis allowable based on the mechanical properties 
derived from the tabs were used in the structural analysis of the pressurized elements, so a potentially 
serious structural integrity issue with the hardware was averted (Figures 54 – 57) [23]. An example of 
the instrumentation used to predicted stresses in critical areas of the Node 1 aft ring is shown in Figure 
58[24]. 
 
Figure 53 – Excerpt from Node 1 Stress Analysis showing requirements to extract samples from the 
forgings used to produce the circumferential rings on the Node, Lab and Airlock. 
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Figure 54 – Mechanical properties data from the samples extracted from 18 ring forgings provided for 
used in the ISS pressurized elements. 
 
Figure 55 – First-article cut-up data indicating a knockdown factor on the forging tab data is required. 
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Figure 56 – Recommended A-basis allowables for ring forgings. 
 
Figure 57 – Recommended A-basis allowable vs. forging tab data for Node 1 and Node STA rings.  
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Figure 58 – Example of instrumentation used to verify stress distribution in the Node STA aft ring. 
A discussion of the unique structural verification activities directly pertaining to the Common Berthing 
Mechanism (CBM) is warranted. The CBM was designed, assembled and qualified by Boeing-Huntsville. 
It consists of both an active half and a passive half that is attached to each non-Russian pressurized 
element of the ISS. The interfaces between the CBM and each pressurized element were specified in a 
CBM to Pressurized Element Interface Control Document. Small differences in the vestibule 
configuration for the various elements often drove some unique features at each interface, but the 
structural load path between both halves of the CBM and between the CBM and the pressurized 
element was tightly controlled and required rigorous analysis. 
A detailed solid-element finite element model was developed for both the active and passive halves of 
the CBM. These models were integrated with finite element models of each pressurized element 
endcone. Where the two individual elements were mated via CBM, the integrated models of the active 
and passive CBM/module endcones were joined and the required on-orbit mechanical loads, pressure 
loads and thermal loads were applied across the integrated finite element models. In addition, detailed 
finite element models of the flanges for both sides of the on-orbit interface were used to evaluate their 
deformation under pressure loads prior to mating, during the mating operation when bolt-up loads 
were applied and after mating. This assured that the required interface ovality and planarity was 
maintained and that sufficient load would be applied around the circumference of the interface flange 
to form a pressure seal across the three o-rings in the passive CBM seal assembly. The CBM was certified 
to fully withstand the on-orbit mated interface loads combined with pressure, including a condition 
where  with one of the 15 motorized bolts would not be engaged. It was also certified to withstand the 
on-orbit mechanical loads (without pressure) for two adjacent bolts not engaged.  
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The CBM was certified for pressure and on-orbit thermally-induced loads combined with flange 
deflections in the Assembly Level Qualification Test program at MSFC. This rig was located at MSFC and 
was a full thermal-vacuum qualification test set-up where both halves of the CBM interface were 
brought together to certify the contact dynamics models, the 16 motorized bolts were engaged and 
disengaged multiple times, the vestibule was pressurized, both the Shuttle Remote Manipulator System 
(SRMS) and the Space Station Remote Manipulator System (SSRMS) dynamic responses were simulated 
and man-in-the loop testing was performed. This rig was essential for the certification of the CBM for 
both the on-orbit mating operation and structural integrity. 
The “Unity” Node with PMAs 1 and 2 attached to it was launched on STS-88 on December 4, 1998 and 
successfully mated to the FGB on December 6, 1998.  
During the first ingress, it was noted that the axial port hatch, when opened, did not travel all of the way 
up its tracks (Figure 59) [25]. One small detail was missed during Node proof pressure testing and hatch 
installation. The pressure deflections of the Node endcone could close the existing gap between the 
hatch rollers and the hatch track causing the hatch to bind in an intermediate position (Figure 60) [26]. 
After some review of the pressure test data for all of the USOS modules and some tolerance analysis of 
the hatch and track assembly, a simple modification was made to all axial port hatch rollers still on the 
ground and the next ISS crew performed this modification on-orbit for the Node 1 hatches to alleviate 
the problem (Figures 61 and 62)[27].  
After three successful EVAs as well as IVA activities inside the nascent space complex, the “Unity” and 
“Zarya” were activated to form the core of the ISS. 
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Figure 59 – Figure showing axial and radial port hatch configurations for Node 1. 
 
Figure 60 – Pressure-induced deflection interference between rollers and hatch tracks. 
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Figure 61 – Axial hatch roller details. 
 
Figure 62 – Axial hatch roller adjustment procedure. 
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“Destiny” Laboratory 
The Common Module STA was intended to be used to certify the U.S. “Destiny” Laboratory flight article 
structure and then it was to be refurbished into a Habitation module to be launched to ISS on a later 
flight. The Common Module STA had holes for two windows rather than the one window on the U.S. 
Lab, but in all other ways was identical in construction to the U.S. Lab.  Like the Node, it was constructed 
of Aluminum 2219 and only the skin panels were stretched isogrid (Figure 63). VPPA welding was also 
used to weld the skin sections to one another and to the circumferential ring forgings. The Common 
Module STA structural verification test campaign included a proof pressure test with 100% X-ray and 
ultrasonic NDE on the welds both pre- and post-proof testing, a post-proof leak test of the welds, a 
modal test and a static test. The Lab Flight Article structural verification included a proof pressure test as 
well as a detailed verification campaign on the 20” fused silica window to satisfy the requirements of 
SSP 30560. 
 
Figure 63 – U.S. “Destiny” Laboratory being lowered into KSC vacuum chamber for element leak 
testing (Isogrid skin panels and nadir window installation are visible). 
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The proof pressure test to 1.5 times the MDP was completed successfully on the Common Module STA. 
Since the Common Module STA and the Lab Module Flight Article did not have any radial ports, it did not 
experience the gusset yielding and creep that occurred on both the Node STA and Node 1 Flight Article 
(Figure 64) [28]. Subsequent to the proof test, leak testing on the welds and seals was successfully 
performed (Figure 65) [29].  
The modal test of the Common Module STA was performed at MSFC using the Space Shuttle Payload 
Bay Modal Test Bed at MSFC and included runs with and without a PMA mass simulator on the forward 
axial port to provide the dynamic characteristics of the module endcone (Figure 66) [30]. The endcone 
secondary structure was installed in both of the Common Module’s endcones and one mass-loaded rack 
standoff structure that was six bays long was also installed. Pre-test modal analysis of this configuration 
showed that it was sufficient to exercise the Common Module structure to develop the mode shapes in 
the frequency ranges of interest for both Shuttle and ISS dynamic model validation. Until Node 2 was 
launched, the Orbiter docked to the PMA on the axial port of the Lab, so dynamic characterization of 
this interface was require for mated, on-orbit loads development (Figure 67). A detailed modal survey 
and sine sweep including dedicated measurements of the driving point impedance on the mass loaded 
axial port were performed. Also, a rudimentary internal reverberation acoustic test to provide some 
data for the internal acoustic environment was conducted (Figures 68 and 69)[31]. While the intent of 
this acoustic testing was to support the development of a Statistical Energy Analysis (SEA) model, this 
model was not built and a mass scaling analysis of the MPLM vibroacoustic test data was used instead to 
provide vibration environments for rack-mounted internal equipment. 
 
Figure 64 – Common Module STA proof pressure and leak test sequence. 
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Figure 65 – Welds and seal leak testing of the Common Module STA. 
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Figure 66 – Sample of the modal analysis of the Lab modal test configuration. 
 
 
 
Figure 67 – Space Shuttle Orbiter attached to PMA-2 at the forward axial port of the U.S. “Destiny” 
laboratory. 
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Figure 68 – Internal vibroacoustic setup for the Common Module STA. 
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Figure 69 – Analysis plan for confirming the applicability of internal Spacelab random vibration 
environments to the “Destiny” Laboratory. 
Due to the delays in the Node structural verification test campaign, a decision was made to duplicate 
the Static Test Fixture at MSFC at the Boeing-Seattle’s, Everett, Washington test facility and ship the 
Common Module STA there for static testing. This test campaign included several load cases to exercise 
the trunnions and keel to the enveloping Orbiter loads environments. These tests included several cases 
which exercised the Common Module STA trunnions and pressure shell structure to 1.2 x design limit 
load and an Orbiter longeron to Common Module STA trunnion relative deflection case. Some of the 
finite element models used in the Common Module structural analysis are shown in Figures 70 through 
74 [32].Stresses due to weld mismatch on the STA pressure shell were also characterized (Figure 75) 
[33].  
The Common Module STA test series also included a test case of the rack internal fittings, where the 
internal longeron was loaded in the short transverse direction (Figure 76) [34]. Static tests to 1.5 x limit 
load of the Module-To-Truss Structure interfaces on the Lab pressure shell were performed. A test of 
the Power Data Grapple Fixture (PDGF) mounting structure to the loads induced during the Lab’s 
extraction from the Orbiter payload bay and attachment to ISS was also part of the test series.  
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In planning for the PDGF mounting structure static test, it was found that the PDGF support structure 
was significantly under-designed. The hardware was redesigned, the grapple fixture interface was 
successfully tested to 1.5 x limit load and the rest of the static test program was completed successfully. 
The Common Module STA was returned to Huntsville, Alabama where it is currently being used as part 
of an Advanced Environmental Control and Life Support System (ECLSS) test bed. 
 
Figure 70 – Low-fidelity Finite element model of the Common Module STA. 
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Figure 71 – High-fidelity finite element model of Common Module STA used for static test correlation. 
 
Figure 72 - Detailed model used to evaluate the Common Module STA Aft Ring. 
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Figure 73 – FEM cross-section showing displacement of the CM STA aft ring and cylinder skin under 
pressure loads. 
 
 
Figure 74 – Detailed model used to evaluate Common Module STA external longeron stability. 
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Figure 75 – Stresses in Forward and Aft Ring Girth and Bulkhead Welds for the CM STA with weld 
mismatch included. 
 
The Lab Flight Article structure underwent proof pressure testing at Huntsville, Alabama to 1.5 times 
MDP. Pre- and post-proof NDE on all of the welds and post-proof leak testing of all of the welds was 
performed on the element (Figure 77) [35]. A few, slightly loose, dummy feedthroughs on the Lab Flight 
Article produced a blowing, whistling leak during the proof pressure test, but the facility air supply was 
able to maintain the internal pressure and there was no damage to the hardware. It was also the test 
article in which the 20” diameter, redundant-paned, fused silica window was certified for pressure. The 
requirements for window certification were documented in SSP 30560. These included detailed 
requirements for window verification including no glass to metal contact at 2.0 x MDP, the ability to 
safely change-out a window on-orbit, the need to verify the stress field in each window pane and the 
redundancy of each window pane under internal pressure loads.  
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Figure 76 – Rack interface loads at rack attachments to the Common Module STA. 
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Figure 77 – Lab Flight Article Proof Pressure / Leak Test Sequence. 
As part of the Lab Flight Article’s structural test campaign, a specific series of tests was performed to 
verify the structural performance of the 20” window assembly (Figure 78). The window consists of 
redundant pressure panes protected by an external debris pane and an internal scratch pane (Figure 79) 
[36] making a total of four panes in the stack. 
Since aluminum has the same elastic modulus as fused silica glass, aluminum plates of the same 
thickness as the glass panes were substituted for the two glass panes in the window frame and installed 
in the Lab Flight Article. These plates were instrumented during the proof pressure test and strain 
readings were recorded. Deflection gages were also located around the frame to characterize the 
deflection of the window assembly.  
After this testing was completed, the aluminum plates that represented the window panes were 
alternately removed and the module tested at MDP to assure that the loss of one window pane would 
not compromise the integrity of the window assembly. An internal pressure cover was placed over the 
window assembly to assure the window could be covered should one of the panes become damaged. 
Finally, the entire window assembly was removed and an external cover was placed on the exterior of 
the module and the module was tested to assure pressure and structural integrity of the external cover 
and to show that a window could be changed-out effectively on-orbit (Figures 80 through 83)[37]. This 
testing and the subsequent correlation and extrapolation of the window stress analysis to 2.0 times 
57 
 
MDP confirmed that the 20”-diameter window would be safe for what was the then-projected to be a 
15-year life of the ISS (Figures 84 and 85) [38]. 
A redundancy test of the 20” redundant pressure pane assembly as also performed. For this test, a full 
20” window lab assembly test article with both fused silica panes included was pressurized on one side 
to 15.2 psid and a weighted stylus was dropped on the outer, redundant pressure pane. This test had to 
be performed twice, because on the first attempt to shatter the redundant pane, the stylus damaged 
the window but did not shatter it. The second attempt used a heavier stylus dropped from a greater 
height. This completely shattered the redundant pane while the primary pressure pane retained its 
structural and pressure integrity. 
Since glass is subject to static fatigue, a fleet leader window of identical construction as the Lab 20” 
window was built and has been under 15.2 psid pressure at the NASA-Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center’s 
Structures Test Lab since the year 2000 (Figure 86 and 87). It is periodically inspected for flaws and leak 
tested. The fleet leader window has remained in excellent condition while the U.S. Lab window is 
periodically inspected on-orbit for flaws. As described above, the debris pane which covers the exterior 
of the Lab window and the scratch pane which covers the interior of the Lab window are present on-
orbit to prevent incidental damage to the redundant pressure panes from micro-meteoroids and orbital 
debris as well as crew-induced damage. The only maintenance activity that has had to be performed on 
the Lab window on-orbit to-date involved replacing a leaking flex hose that is used to keep the cavity 
between the two panes at vacuum. The flex hose was inadvertently damaged and was replaced on-orbit. 
A protective cover was installed over the flex hose to prevent any reoccurrence of this problem. 
 
Figure 78 - “Destiny” Laboratory 20” diameter nadir-facing windows with flex hose cover installed. 
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Figure 79 – Cross-sectional view of the “Destiny” laboratory 20” window installation. 
 
Figure 80 – Proof Pressure nadir window configurations with and without external panes. 
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Figure 81 – Nadir window limit pressure test cases on the redundant pane and the internal pressure 
cover. 
 
Figure 82 – Nadir window limit pressure testing with internal and external covers installed. 
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Figure 83 – Nadir window limit pressure tests on the redundant pane and the external pressure cover. 
 
Figure 84 – Solid FEM of the nadir window installation. 
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Figure 85 – Cross-section of nadir window installation FEM. 
 
Figure 86 – Fleet leader window test article currently residing in the Building 13 Structures Test Lab at 
NASA-JSC. 
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Figure 87 – Close-up of Lab window fleet leader test article glass panes. 
A discussion of the pressure wall thickness for the Lab module is appropriate at this point. The pressure 
wall thickness for the cylindrical section of the Lab and Airlock (and subsequently extended to the JEM 
module, Columbus Module and MPLM), was determined not by pressure or mechanical loads, but by 
risk mitigation of the potential for catastrophic failure of the pressure shell in the event of a penetration 
by MM/OD (called “unzipping”).  
Unzipping was assessed by determining the critical crack length of the Lab module pressure shell over a 
range of pressure wall thicknesses. Using the probabilistic model of the orbital debris environment, 
analysts determined that an increase in thickness from 1/8” to 3/16” would increase the critical crack 
length by 50% and significantly reduce the probability of catastrophic failure of the module structure 
due to an MM/OD penetration. (The Node pressure wall thickness was well above 3/16” due to the 
radial port penetrations.) A decision package to increase the Lab module wall thickness was approved by 
the ISS Program (Figure 87) [39]. Similar assessments on other modules were conducted after the 
decision package was approved. The Airlock design used a minimum 3/16” pressure wall thickness as did 
the JEM, MPLM and Columbus Modules. 
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Figure 87 – Decision Package increasing the ISS Lab Module pressure wall thickness. 
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The “Destiny” laboratory was launched on February 7, 2001 and mated to the “Unity” Node on February 
10th. After three spacewalks and some IVA activities, the Lab was activated and remains the centerpiece 
of the USOS. 
“Quest” Airlock, High Pressure Gas Tank (HPGT) ORUs 
The “Quest” Airlock was a unique ISS pressurized element structure in that there was no dedicated 
structural test article. It consisted of two compartments - a Crew Lock (CL) and an Equipment Lock (EL).  
The CL was manufactured by Rockwell International Corporation in Downey, California, and was derived 
from an Orbiter external airlock structure including a D-hatch (but no window) from which two 
spacewalking astronauts could egress the ISS. The EL was manufactured by The Boeing Company in 
Huntsville, Alabama and consisted of a cylindrical section of Aluminum 2219, isogrid skin panels and ring 
forgings between two endcones. The Crew Lock was attached to the CBM ring on one Equipment Lock 
endcone by a transition structure. A passive CBM and hatch was installed on the other endcone of the 
Equipment Lock in order to attach to a Node 1 radial port (Figures 88 through 91)[40]. 
 
 
Figure 88 – “Quest” Airlock primary structure. 
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Figure 89 – “Quest” Airlock on-orbit configuration showing 4 High Pressure Gas tanks installed. 
 
Figure 90 – Crewlock primary structure. 
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Figure 91 – Transition adapter between the Equipment Lock and the Crewlock. 
Structural testing of the Airlock included a proof pressure test campaign where the Equipment Lock was 
proof-pressure tested to 22.8 psid with a hatch installed at the EL/CL interface while the Crewlock 
remained at atmospheric pressure. Then, a pressure equalization valve between the two compartments 
was opened and the internal pressure in both sections of the Airlock reached 22.8 psid. NDE of the 
Equipment Lock occurred both pre- and post-proof testing in addition to a post-proof weld leak test. 
(The Crew Lock had been separately proof pressure tested and the welds inspected prior to delivery to 
Boeing.) Bonded doublers, similar to those used on the Orbiter Crew Module, were used to strengthen 
several weld mismatch areas on the Crew Lock. This proof pressure test was successful and was 
instrumental in determining the integrity of the factory weld repairs on the Crew Lock. 
The launch configuration of the Airlock is worth discussing since it differed from the on-orbit 
configuration in a significant way. Only one ISS Common Hatch was launched with the Airlock in order to 
save weight. This hatch was at the Equipment Lock axial port and it held the internal pressure in the 
combined Equipment Lock/Crew Lock volume during launch. After attachment to the ISS, this hatch was 
moved by the ISS crew onto the opposite endcone between the Equipment Lock and Crew Lock. The 
hatch was closed and subsequently successfully leak tested during that flight. This operation saved 
approximately 600 pounds of launch weight since only one internal hatch had to be launched with the 
Airlock. 
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Static testing of the Airlock was successfully completed in Building 4619. A table of static test conditions 
performed is provided in Figure 92 [41]. Testing was in accordance with the protoflight structure 
requirements of NSTS 14046 (1.2 x limit load for Orbiter load conditions). The airlock structure was 
designed to a minimum structural factor of safety of 1.25 on yield and 1.4 on ultimate for these load 
conditions (Figure 93) [42]. On-orbit loads testing of the CBM interface was not performed because 
previous load testing on the Node CBM enveloped the Airlock to Node interface loads. The test 
campaign included a maximum bending test for the Equipment Lock to Crew Lock interface (Figures 94 
through 97) [43] because endcone buckling of the Equipment Lock at the Crew Lock interface was 
difficult to predict analytically due to the large empirical knockdown factors applied to analytical 
predictions for shell buckling. Figures 98 through 100 [44] show the type and location of 
instrumentation needed to characterize the effect of bending moment on the equipment lock endcone. 
 
Figure 92 – Summary table of test conditions for the “Quest” Airlock primary structure. 
 
Figure 93 – Airlock Configuration for static loads testing. 
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Figure 94 – Airlock Static Test Condition 2 Configuration. 
 
Figure 95 – Airlock Static Test Condition 2 Objectives. 
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Figure 96 – Airlock Static Test Condition 2 loads. 
 
Figure 97 – Airlock Test Condition 2 Crewlock/Equipment lock interface loads. 
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Figure 98 – Airlock Static Test Condition 2 instrumentation 
 
Figure 99 – EDI locations for Airlock Test Condition 2. 
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Figure 100 – Strain gage locations for Airlock Test Condition 2. 
Influence coefficient tests of the trunnion system were significantly important for the Airlock 
certification due to their minimal spread (Figures 101 – 105) [45]. Influence coefficient tests are 
primarily used to exercise a structure along a single axis to loads much lower than the certification test 
loads to assure that the pre-test analytical predictions of load distribution through the structure are 
accurate. These influence coefficient tests verify the stiffness in the local region of the longeron 
trunnions and provided the data required to show that the Orbiter launch and landing load cases would 
not damage the protoflight Airlock structure. 
 
Figure 101 – “Quest” Airlock Trunnion System Configuration. 
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Figure 102 – Airlock Trunnion Z-direction Influence Coefficient Stiffness Test Objectives. 
 
Figure 103 – Airlock Trunnion Z-direction Influence Coefficient Stiffness Test Objectives. 
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Figure 104 – Airlock Trunnion X-direction Influence Coefficient Stiffness Test Objectives. 
 
Figure 105 – Airlock Trunnion X-direction Influence Coefficient Stiffness Test Objectives. 
After the influence coefficient tests were performed, several other tests on the airlock were completed 
including, a grapple fixture support structure test, internal rack fitting tests, and a keel rollover test to 
assure that the allowable travel inside the orbiter trunnion fitting was not exceeded due to the minimal 
spread of the longeron trunnions were also performed.  Since a pair of large tool boxes for EVA 
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equipment was launched attached to the Crewlock, the interfaces for these tool boxes also had to be 
static tested as well (Figure 106) [46]. 
 
Figure 106 – ESTD toolbox test configuration on the “Quest” Airlock. 
Perfection is elusive in all manufacturing operations and it became necessary for the ISS Structures 
Team to assess discrepancies with the Airlock structure. There were a pair of misdrilled holes at the 
primary trunnion interfaces (Figures 107 - 109) [47] that had to be analyzed and dispositioned (Figures 
110-111) [48]. There were occasional manufacturing discrepancies on the elements of the ISS structure, 
but these were the exception and all were dispositioned without significant rework being required. 
Structural analysis is typically performed on the as-built structure when conditions warrant, so a revision 
to the fracture analysis, the fail-safe analysis and structural margin calculations for the Airlock primary 
trunnion fittings for a fewer number of holes was performed and the structural integrity of the new 
trunnion interface configuration was confirmed. 
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Figure 107 – Location of misdrilled hole at Airlock primary trunnion fittings. 
 
Figure 108 – Analysis process for the Airlock Port Primary Trunnion Fitting misdrilled holes. 
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Figure 109 – Analysis process for the Airlock Starboard Primary Trunnion Fitting misdrilled Holes. 
 
Figure 110 – Structural margin calculation for the “as-built” configuration of the Airlock port primary 
trunnion interface. 
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Figure 111 – Structural margin calculation for the “as-built” configuration of the Airlock starboard 
primary trunnion interface. 
Another issue which arose during the airlock assembly was a broken bolt that was discovered at the 
Equipment Lock to Crew Lock transition adapter interface during a routine inspection of the hardware 
on the shop floor. Micrographs of the failure surface and structural analysis were reviewed to determine 
that the most likely cause of the bolt’s failure was an aggressive overtorquinq of the bolt head. A 
summary of the testing on a representative bolt to confirm its structural capability is provided in Figure 
112 [49]. After the investigation, greater security measures and access controls were implemented on 
the factory floor and no repeat of such an incident occurred for the remainder of the ISS pressurized 
element structural fabrication effort. 
These manufacturing anomalies received a great deal of scrutiny because the Airlock was a protoflight 
structure. It was one-of-a-kind, so there was no follow-on article to correct any discrepancies. Also, the 
static test program could not have induced any detrimental deformation, or worse-a failure of some 
kind, which would have resulted in a severe cost and schedule impact to the ISS Program. 
The data from the Airlock structural testing was used to correlate the finite element models used to 
develop final structural margins. Two of these models are shown in Figure 113 [50]. The modal test 
performed in the Space Shuttle Payload Modal Test Bed at MSFC provided data that was used to provide 
a dynamic model to the Shuttle and ISS Programs for verification loads assessment. 
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Figure 112 – Assessment of failed Equipment Lock to Crew Lock transition adapter interface bolt. 
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Figure 113 – Examples of finite element models used for stress assessment of the Airlock. 
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There were four High Pressure Gas Tanks (HPGTs) that were launched with the Airlock on a separate 
cross-bay pallet (Figure 114) and installed on the Equipment Lock by EVA that had to go through both 
static and modal testing as well as get fit-checked to their on-orbit interfaces. Dedicated static testing of 
the HPGT interfaces to their carrier and modal testing of an HPGT tank assembly were performed. 
Tooling which simulated the Equipment Lock interface was developed and all four HPGT Orbital 
Replacement Units (ORUs) that were launched on the flight along with a fifth spare HPGT ORU were fit-
checked to the tooling and all HPGT ORUs were found to be interchangeable amongst all locations. 
The HPGT themselves are Composite Overwrapped Pressure Vessels composed of carbon-fiber/resin 
with stainless steel liners.  These tanks were proof-pressure tested to 1.5 x MDP and their stress-rupture 
life was calculated. About a decade after they were launched, concerns were raised regarding the stress-
rupture life of composite overwrapped tanks used on the Space Shuttle and the ISS. (Composite 
Overwrapped Pressure Vessels (COPVs) are also used on the ammonia and nitrogen tanks on the S1 and 
P1 trusses as well as in the Plasma Contactor Xenon tank on the Z1 truss.) After extensive analysis and 
testing, the stress rupture life issues for the ISS COPVs were resolved. 
 
Figure 114 – STS-104 cargo element in the Orbiter Payload Bay (Four HPGT’s on their carrier are shown 
at the top of the photo). 
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STS-104 containing the “Quest” Airlock and the High Pressure Gas Tanks was launched on July 12, 2001. 
The Airlock was installed on ISS on July 15th with the High Pressure Gas Tank installations occurring later 
in the mission. The final of the three spacewalks on the mission occurred from the “Quest” Airlock. The 
airlock structure was certified for an estimated 52 EVAs per year over 15 years, so it is anticipated that it 
will have more than enough structural life for the duration of the ISS program. (As of May, 2011 there 
have been a total of 93 EVA’s have been performed from the “Quest” Airlock.) 
Pressurized Mating Adapters 
The Pressurized Mating Adapter was a transition structure originally designed to provide the interface 
between the Space Shuttle Orbiter and the Space Station Freedom. Its unique shape was developed to 
preclude contact between the Node or Lab endcone and the Orbiter Forward Fuselage during docking 
with the Shuttle External Airlock. It was constructed from four Aluminum 2219 forgings, machined to the 
required thickness and circumferentially welded using VPPA welding by The Boeing Company, 
Huntington Beach, California (Figure 115). 
 
Figure 115 – Pressurized Mating Adapter undergoing final assembly at Boeing – Huntington Beach. 
When the FGB and Service Module were added to the assembly sequence, the PMA was selected as the 
interface between the aft axial port on Node 1 and the forward port on the FGB. This required that a 
third PMA be added to the program baseline to provide redundant docking interfaces for the Orbiter as 
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well as a permanent interface between the Node 1 and the FGB. The Androgynous Peripheral Attach 
System (APAS) was added as the interface between both the FGB and the Shuttle Orbiter Docking 
System and the PMA. The PMA was sized for the pressure and the on-orbit dynamic loads of Orbiter 
docking and also for the loads at the FGB/PMA interface. 
The interface loads between the FGB and the PMA were negotiated between U.S. and Russian engineers 
and provided to the Boeing Company as structural design criteria in the FGB/PMA Interface Control 
Document. The maximum design pressure for the PMA was 16.0 pounds per square inch absolute (psia) 
based on Orbiter Environmental Control and Life Support System (ECLSS) failure modes. An APAS from 
RSC-Energia and a CBM from Boeing-Huntsville were provided for integration on the opposite ends of 
the PMA. 
During the ISS Program definition activity, a decision was made to delete all structural testing on the 
PMA with the exception of a proof pressure test (Figure 116) [51]. This programmatic decision required 
technical rationale to be developed ex-post-facto.  The PMA would be the primary interface between ISS 
and Shuttle and between the U.S. and Russian Segments for the life of the ISS, so this structural 
verification approach required a great deal of engineering work to justify. The MM/OD shields on the 
PMA were attached using bolts rather than DZUS fasteners as was done for the Lab, Node and Airlock 
and the successful acoustic testing of the Lab MM/OD shield lent credibility to the deletion of the 
acoustic test. The PMAs were mass simulated during the Node STA modal test, so their contribution to 
the dynamics of the overall integrated STS-88 payload would be characterized and included in the 
dynamic math models provided to the Shuttle Program. The static strength capability of the PMA, as 
determined by analysis, showed high margins of safety for both the pressure only and on-orbit 
combined pressure and mechanical loads.   
 
Figure 116 – PMA Proof Pressure Test Set-up. 
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A concern for the PMA was the residual stresses in the welds joining the four forgings of the PMA 
pressure shell. The manufacturing development article fabricated for the PMA pressure shell showed 
excessive weld mismatch and distortion at each circumferential weld due to the VPPA weld process 
(Figure 117) [52]. With the help of NASA and Boeing engineers who had worked this issue on the Node 
structure, the weld process was refined and the three subsequent PMA articles showed significantly less 
mismatch (sentence repeated below). However, the verification that the stress analysis predicted the 
behavior of the PMA under pressure and on-orbit loads accounting for the weld mismatch required a 
new pressure test to be performed on the PMA weld development unit.   
 
Figure 117 – Weld Mismatch on the PMA Manufacturing Development Unit. 
The PMA weld process development unit was subjected to a 70 psi pressure test (Figure 118) [53]. This 
test condition was intended to simulate the combined on-orbit stresses that the PMA would see when 
pressurized to the maximum design pressure of 16.0 psi and the on-orbit mechanical loads. The PMA 
was heavily instrumented to understand its behavior under pressure (Figure 119) [54]. This test 
successfully reached 70 psi but as the pressure was reduced multiple gages exhibited erratic behavior. 
Due to the pressure levels and the large internal volume of the PMA, the test was performed in a 
covered outdoor test bunker. During the test it began to rain and the erratic behavior of the gages was 
attributed to moisture entering some of the strain gage circuitry. In addition to a sensitivity study using 
the integrated ISS on-orbit dynamic model where the Young’s Modulus in the PMA was varied between 
+100% and -50% (Reference: PMA Structural Integrity Report [55]) of its predicted value showed 
negligible differences in the dynamic response and therefore no increase in on-orbit loads. Both the test 
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results and the dynamic analysis enabled a cogent technical rationale to be developed for the limited 
structural verification approach employed on the PMA (item between the commas is too long for this 
sentence). Subsequently, each of the three flight PMAs were successfully proof pressure tested to 1.5 x 
MDP with a reduced set of instrumentation. The weld mismatch for the flight PMAs was significantly less 
than the development unit PMA as Boeing-HB with assistance from MSFC weld experts improved their 
tooling fixity, weld process and allowables development process (Figure 120) [56] The technical 
rationale for limited test program was challenged when one of the PMAs was lifted by a crane prior to 
being unbolted from its support stand. However analysis and inspection showed this incident did not 
damage the hardware.  
PMA-1 and PMA-2, mounted on the aft and forward endcones of Node 1, were launched on STS-88 and 
the PMA-3 was launched attached to a modified Spacelab pallet carrier on STS-92 (Figure 121) [57]. The 
Flight Support Equipment (FSE) to launch PMA-3 was designed, built and tested at MSFC by The Boeing 
Company. A static test of the FSE to 1.2 x limit load was performed. Static loads were applied to the FSE 
through a PMA simulator (Figure 122 and 123) [58]. The Spacelab Pallet did not have to be recertified 
for static loads as the hardware was designed and tested to an ultimate factor of safety of 1.4. A modal 
survey of this configuration was also performed. The FSE was heavily instrumented with strain and 
deflection gages and the individual struts and lugs were characterized for load vs. strain before they 
were incorporated into the static test assembly (Figure 124) [59].  
 
Figure 118 – Stresses-induced in welds by 70 psi pressure test on the PMA development unit. 
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Figure 119 – Strain gage locations on the PMA. 
 
86 
 
 
Figure 120 – Summary of weld characterization testing performed for the PMA weld process. 
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Figure 121 – PMA-3 on its Spacelab Pallet Carrier. 
 
Figure 122 – PMA Simulator attached to the PMA-3 FSE/Spacelab Pallet. 
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Figure 123 - Static test configuration for the PMA-3 FSE. 
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Figure 124 – Strain Gage layout for PMA-3 FSE. 
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Node 2 
With the decision by the ISS Program for the European Space Agency to provide both Node 2 and Node 
3, the structural design of these elements was no longer common with that of Node 1 so a new 
structural verification test campaign needed to be developed. The Node 2/3 structural design was based 
on the Multi-Purpose Logistics Module (MPLM) design, so these two nodes were longer than Node 1. 
Consequently, the mass, trunnion spacing and on-orbit loads would result in entirely new launch and on-
orbit loading environments beyond what the Node 1 was certified to. It was ESA’s responsibility to 
certify the Node 2/3 structures to the new loads requirements. Both Node 2 and Node 3 were designed, 
manufactured and tested by Thales Alenia Space Italy. The primary structure was constructed from 
Aluminum 2219. The radial port design was based on drawings supplied by The Boeing Company. VPPA 
welding was used to join the various segments. 
The structural verification approach for Node 2/3 differed in several significant ways from Node 1. First 
of all, there was no complete module structure used as a static test article. A simulator, consisting of 
two adjacent radial ports and an axial port that were stiffened to represent the Node 2 structure, was 
used for static testing.  Pressure domes were installed over each port.  Pressure testing to 2.0 x MDP and 
combined pressure and mechanical loads testing to 1.5 x (pressure + mechanical loads) was performed 
on the Node 2/3 STA (but you just said there was no STA). (There were also a few cases where the 
hardware was critical for on-orbit mechanical loads only. That hardware was tested to 1.5 x limit 
mechanical loads.)  A proof pressure test was performed on both flight articles and CBM radial port 
flange displacements were measured during this test to confirm they were within their certified limits. 
Post-proof test NDE was only performed on the welds of Node 3 (per ECP170). Modal testing was 
performed on the Node 2 flight article.  
The structural strength and acoustic certification for launch in the Shuttle Orbiter payload bay for Node 
2/3 also leveraged on the MPLM design, where an ultimate loads test to 1.4 x limit load and an acoustic 
test to the 141 decibel (dB) Overall Acoustic Sound Pressure Level (OASPL) were performed on a 
dedicated MPLM test article in Toulouse, France. The Meteoroid/Debris Panels  (MDPS) on the MPLM 
were certified by similarity and component level ultimate load tests on the trunnion systems were used 
to certify the Node structure to the launch loads. This overall structural verification approach received a 
great deal of scrutiny from all of the stakeholders. One issue that did arise was the lack of post-proof 
test NDE on the welds of the Node 2 structure. An element level leak test in the Kennedy Space Center 
Operations and Checkout Building vacuum chamber for Node 2 and a one atmosphere delta-pressure 
helium accumulation test for Node 3 alleviated any leakage or structural integrity concerns with the 
welds on the hardware (Figure 125) [60]. 
The Node 2, dubbed “Harmony”, was launched on October 23, 2007 and was attached to the “Destiny” 
lab on November 14th. It later became the central hub for the attachment of the “Kibo” Japanese 
Experiment Module, “Columbus” Attached Pressurized Module and PMA-2. It also accepts both the 
MPLM and the H-II Transfer Vehicle (HTV), operated by the Japanese Aerospace Exploration Agency 
(JAXA) on its nadir port. 
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Figure 125 – Summary of Node 2 weld assessment by the JSC Fracture Control Board. 
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Figure 125 (continued) – Summary of Node 2 Weld assessment by the JSC Fracture Control Board. 
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Figure 125 (continued) – Summary of Node 2 Weld assessment by the JSC Fracture Control Board. 
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Figure 125 (concluded) – Summary of Node 2 Weld assessment by the JSC Fracture Control Board. 
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Node 3/Cupola 
Perhaps the most interesting structural verification campaign was implemented on the Cupola. This 
unusual structure consisted of six trapezoidal shaped windows and a 28”-diameter circular window for 
use by the ISS crew to oversee robotic and docking operations as well as provide spectacular vistas for 
Earth observation. This structure was launched on the port axial port of Node 3 (called “Tranquility”) 
and the Cupola was later moved and attached to the nadir axial port of Node 3. It was built by Thales 
Alenia Space Italy under an ESA contract based on a structural design developed by The Boeing 
Company, Huntsville, Alabama and using fused silica windows supplied by Corning, Inc.  
As was done for the Lab structural verification, aluminum plates were substituted for glass in order to 
determine stress distributions in the Cupola window panes during pressure testing. The requirement to 
be able to change out a window pane on-orbit was also levied on the Cupola as were all of the other 
requirements from SSP 30560. A dedicated structural test article and a flight article Cupola were 
constructed. The Cupola was constructed from two Aluminum 2219 forgings, one for the cylindrical 
section and another for the section containing the windows.  During stretch forming, one of the 
cylindrical forgings cracked. This was due to a shortcoming in the mechanical process of the 
manufacturing as opposed to a forging material defect. A new forging was successfully stretch-formed 
to replace the destroyed forging. 
NASA was heavily involved in determining the structural verification approach and in training both the 
ESA and Alenia engineers on the specific activities needed to handle, inspect, clean and protect 
aerospace-quality glass. A seven-step test campaign was developed where instrumented aluminum 
plates were substituted for the redundant and primary glass pressure panes and the Cupola STA was 
tested to 2.0 x limit pressure. Then the aluminum plates were systematically removed from one 
trapezoidal window and the overhead circular window in order to understand the change in the stress 
distribution if a primary or redundant pane was lost. Additionally, to demonstrate structural integrity of 
the Cupola in the event of a window change-out operation, pressure tests were performed with either 
both panes of a trapezoidal window or both panes of the overhead window completely removed These 
tests were performed with an external pressure cover over the opening created when the window was 
completely removed.  Finally, a 2.0 x limit pressure test was performed with no glass panes included on 
the Cupola STA. This test plan is shown in Figure 126 [61].  
A modal test was performed on the Cupola STA with aluminum panes installed in all of the window 
assemblies to provide a dynamic math model for both its launch configuration attached to Node 3 and 
for its inclusion with the ISS structural dynamic math model. No static testing was performed on the 
Cupola STA because the primary driving load case was on-orbit pressure.  Also, the Node 3 radial port 
CBM was certified to a much higher bending moment than that induced by the Cupola during launch. 
The Cupola STA was outfitted for the element-level acoustic test with one trapezoidal glass window and 
the overhead glass window with external shutters installed. During the instrumentation procedure, a 
strain gage wire was inadvertently squeezed between the frame of a trapezoidal window and the glass 
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causing a crack in the glass. This window was replaced and the acoustic test was successfully performed 
to the 141dB OASPL environment. The windows were inspected in place after the acoustic test with no 
damage identified. One trapezoidal window assembly and the overhead window assembly, both with 
glass panes included, also successfully passed a component-level random vibration test with no damage. 
The actual flight window assemblies were installed for a final proof pressure test to 1.5 x limit pressure 
on the Cupola flight article after the strain gage data from the aluminum panes were correlated with the 
Cupola finite element model.  (The aluminum panes were never used in the Cupola flight article, only on 
the STA). A helium leak test was performed on each flight seal installation of each flight window 
assembly to verify the required redundancy and performance of each flight seal installation. A helium 
accumulation leak test was performed to complete the structural test campaign (Figure 127). The 
Cupola was shipped from Alenia to KSC where the windows received a final inspection prior to mating 
with Node 3.  
The Node3/Cupola was launched by STS-130 on February 8, 2010. It was successfully ingressed on that 
mission and has provided views for some of the most spectacular imagery of both the Earth and the ISS 
from inside the ISS (Figure 128 and Figure 129). 
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Figure 126 – Summary of the Cupola STA window pressure test campaign.  
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Figure 126 (continued) – Summary of the Cupola STA window pressure test campaign.  
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Figure 126 (concluded) – Summary of the Cupola STA window pressure test campaign.  
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Figure 127 – Cupola flight article element level leak test. 
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Figure 128 – View of the Cupola attached to Node 3. 
 
Figure 129 – View from inside the Cupola.  
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Integrated Truss Element Structural Verification 
Z1 truss/PMA-3, the Manual Berthing Mechanism and the “analysis-only approach” 
When the ISS assembly sequence was developed, the need to supply power to the vehicle using one pair 
of U.S. solar array wings had to be accommodated early in the configuration. Since there was no way to 
interface the P6 truss structure to Node 1 directly, a transition structure which contained a CBM on one 
end to interface with the Node 1 zenith radial port and a truss attach system on the other end to 
interface with P6 was created. Dubbed the “Z1 truss”, this structure was initially designed to be a 
protoflight structure. When multiple ORUs, such as the Plasma Contactor and four Control Moment 
Gyros were added to this element, a dedicated flight article structure was built, integrated and flown; 
however, the protoflight test approach remained the structural verification strategy for the test article 
since the structural design, analysis and verification planning for this approach had already been put in 
place. The Z1 structure was designed for a minimum Factor of Safety of 1.2 on yield and 1.25 on ultimate 
for on-orbit loads and to 1.40 on ultimate for Shuttle-induced loads. The Z1 Structural Test Article is 
described in Figures 130 and 131 [62]. 
 
Figure 130 – Z1 test article description. 
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Figure 131 – Z1 Test Article Description. 
The Z1 truss was static tested to 1.2 x limit load at The Boeing Company (then Rocketdyne) - Canoga 
Park facility (Figure 132) [63]. The longeron trunnions were exercised with a trunnion planarity loads 
case (Figure 133) [64]. The interface on Z1 to the P6 truss was tested to 1.2 x limit load (Figure 134) [65]. 
The CBM, having been qualified as part of the Node 1 structural test series, was not static tested, but a 
pressure test of a dome that was integrated with the CBM in order to recover the CBM Control Panel 
Assemblies from the Node 1 zenith port was tested to 22.8 psid after the element was delivered to KSC 
(Figure 135) [66]. The Z1 structural test article was thoroughly instrumented with deflection transducers 
and strain gages (Figure 136) [67] in order to correlate the finite element model (Figure 137) [68].  
Despite the best efforts of the team, due to the stiffness of the Z1 truss, the 1.2 x limit load requirement 
was not achieved on the Z1 truss keel trunnion during the static test. The test only achieved 1.08 times 
limit load. The Z1 keel trunnion was analyzed and found to have very high margin of safety, so an 
exception (SSCN 1995) to this requirement was submitted and approved by both the Shuttle and ISS 
Programs. 
A modal survey and sine sweep test of this structure was used to verify the dynamic model provided to 
the Shuttle Program for Verification Loads Analysis (Figure 138) [69]. The Z1 acoustic test to the 141 dB 
OASPL environment for 180 seconds was performed successfully in the Boeing reverberant acoustic 
chamber in Kent, Washington (Figure 139) [70]. The ORUs were represented primarily by MTAM (mass-
thermal-acoustic-mock-ups), but some qualification hardware was included (Figure 140) [71]. 
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Figure 132 – Load fixtures for Z1 Static Test Series. 
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Figure 133 – Z1 trunnion planarity load test case. 
 
Figure 134 – Z1 on-orbit loads test case. 
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Figure 135 – Views of Z1 test article showing PCBM interface and Pressure Dome. 
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Figure 136 – Deflection gage installation on the Z1 Structural Test Article. 
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Figure 137 – Z1 Finite Element Model used for static test correlation. 
 
Figure 138 – Finite Element Model used for Coupled Loads Analysis. 
109 
 
 
Figure 139 – Z1 element acoustic test configuration. 
 
Figure 140 – ORU configurations on the Z1 acoustic test article. 
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On the STS-92 mission in October 2000, the PMA-3 was delivered to orbit with the Z1 truss. A Manual 
Berthing Mechanism (MBM), mounted to a Spacelab Pallet in the Orbiter cargo bay, interfaced with the 
CBM on PMA-3 and was used to provide an attachment system that was strong enough to support the 
PMA-3 for launch, but yet was able to be released by the EVA crewmembers once on-orbit. Two MBM 
units were built, one to be flown in the Orbiter and one that was permanently attached to the Z1 truss. 
While a thermal-vacuum, acoustic and modal test was performed on one MBM assembly, no static 
testing was performed on this unit, nor on the PMA to which it was attached. 
It is illustrative at this time to discuss the “no-test” or “analysis-only” approach to structural verification. 
It is pragmatically impossible to test every load-bearing component on a complex structure. Also, due to 
schedule, budget or technical constraints sometimes large elements are not amenable to full scale static 
testing. The structural integrity of these elements must still be validated by some means.  
In such cases where structural analysis is the primary method of structural verification for ISS primary 
and major secondary structures, significant scrutiny was given to the load derivation process, the 
complexity of the structural load paths, the materials used in construction of the hardware, the 
analytical methods employed and the factors of safety imposed on  design. Most untested ISS primary 
and secondary structure was designed to a minimum factor of safety of 2.0 on ultimate loads with only a 
few exceptions.  
All untested structure was reviewed by both the ISS and Shuttle programs as well as by the responsible 
NASA structural engineers and safety communities.  It should be emphasized that merely using a factor 
of safety of 2.0 does not imply that structural verification by analysis only is an acceptable option. As 
was written into CxP 70135, Structural Design and Verification Requirements for the Constellation 
Program and included in NSTS 14046, Payload Verification Requirements for the Space Shuttle (Section 
5.1.1.3.1), there are no “analysis-only” factors of safety. The verification of a structure must be 
considered on a case-by-case basis, and the appropriate verification methods must be considered based 
on both the requirements and the design of that specific piece of hardware. 
P6/S6 truss, Photovoltaic Radiator (PVR) 
The P6 truss, launched on STS-97, November 30, 2000, was one of the heaviest and largest structures 
attached to the ISS. It spanned almost the entire usable length of the Orbiter payload bay and contained 
four longeron and two keel trunnions, which constrained it in one more Degree of Freedom (DOF) than a 
typical Shuttle payload. It contained a truss section, two photovoltaic thermal control system radiators 
used as the early active thermal control system for the ISS, an Integrated Electronics Assembly (IEA) 
section with a third radiator dedicated to the photovoltaic power system, multiple components of the 
electrical power system including batteries, battery charge/discharge units and voltage regulators, two 
solar array wings in their stowed configurations and a beta gimbal assembly for each solar array wing to 
articulate each array mast individually to track the solar beta angle. The P6 truss segment consisted of 
axial force members constructed out of aluminum and arranged in a box pattern. The IEA was 
constructed from mechanically fastened machined aluminum bulkheads. 
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Structural verification for this element involved a multitude of component tests of the major mechanical 
assemblies in addition to static, modal and acoustic testing of the cargo element. As part of ISS cost 
convergence activity, it was originally proposed that no structural testing be performed on the P6 cargo 
element. After strenuous objections by the principal author, a protoflight approach was taken to 
structurally verify this hardware.  
Dedicated structural test articles for the primary structure and major ORUs were eliminated and units 
that were ultimately refurbished for flight were tested to 1.2 x limit load. These units included the S6 
truss and IEA (used as the P6 structural test article), the Beta Gimbal Assembly, the Photo Voltaic 
Radiator (PVR) and the Solar Array Wing (SAW). Initially it was intended to test the primary Heat 
Rejection System (HRS) Radiator launched on the S1 truss to protoflight levels and qualify the structure 
of the Photovoltaic Radiator (PVR) by “similarity”. However, the size and structure of both radiators 
were significantly different and after the principal author and his team brought this forward to ISS 
Program management, a dedicated structural test to 1.2 x limit load was performed on the PVR. Static 
tests on the PVR and HRS radiators were performed by Lockheed-Martin, Dallas, TX. The PVR passed its 
static test and the results of the HRS radiator static test are described in a later paragraph. 
The P6 static test was performed in Huntsville, Alabama at MSFC in Building 4619 after testing on the 
Node 1 structure was completed but prior to the static testing of the Airlock structure. The test series 
exercised the P6 trunnions to 1.2 times Orbiter launch and landing loads. A trunnion relative deflection 
case and testing of the interfaces on the P6 truss to its major components such as the PVR, BGA, SAW 
and battery ORUs was performed. This testing not only verified the structural integrity of the cargo 
element, but assured that the major structures attached to the cargo element would not come free in 
the payload bay under launch or landing loads. The Rocketdyne Truss Attach System (RTAS) at the end of 
the P6 truss which attached P6 to Z1 (and later to the P5 truss) was also tested to 1.2 x limit loads.  
An extensive test campaign was undertaken on the deployed solar array mast supplied by Able 
Engineering to characterize the strength and natural frequencies of the deployed structure at 1%, 50%, 
99% and 100% deployment for on-orbit loads assessments. These tests helped immensely in certifying 
the deployed solar array for plume loads, docking loads and reboost loads and led to the development 
of multiple operational scenarios for protecting the integrity of the SAW over the life of the ISS. 
Evaluation of the SAW mast is still ongoing for various new load cases that have developed as new 
visiting vehicles are flown to ISS that did not exist in the 1990’s when the solar array was designed as 
well as for longeron shadowing events which were not characterized until the ISS was fully assembled. 
This characterization also helped ground teams resolve the unexpected dynamics during deployment of 
the first pair of Solar Array Wings on STS-97 as well as the tear in one of the P6 solar array wings that 
occurred on October 30, 2007. 
The modal survey and sine sweep of the P6 truss was also performed in the Space Shuttle Payload 
Modal Test Bed at MSFC. Mass simulators for all three radiators as well as the BGA/SAW combination 
and the Battery ORUs were included in the modal test article so that the proper dynamic response could 
be elicited from the test. This test was required for providing a dynamic math model for the cargo 
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element to both the Shuttle and ISS Programs. The P6 structure was then shipped to the Lockheed 
Martin-Denver facility where acoustic simulators were installed in place of the mass simulators used for 
the modal testing and the cargo element was tested to 141dB OASPL environment for one minute. 
Several PV Radiator units were acoustic tested at the component level for three minutes and 
subsequently flown in order to save program cost. These PV Radiators were functionally deployed after 
the acoustic test and structural analysis showed no significant fatigue damage was accumulated on the 
hardware from the sound pressure environment. 
 Acoustic testing on these full-bay truss elements was performed out of concerns for characterizing the 
direct impingement of the acoustic environment on large ORUs such as radiators which were acoustic 
receivers as well as for verification that the design vibration environment derived for these externally 
mounted ORUs was sufficient to prevent them from becoming a catastrophic hazard to the Space 
Shuttle Orbiter during launch (Figure 141). 
The S6 truss segment launched aboard STS-119 on March 15, 2009. Beyond the usual refurbishment of 
incidental wear incurred during structural testing, inspection in the trunnion regions and analysis of the 
structural test loading were performed in order to show that the refurbished P6 structural test article 
could be safely outfitted and launched in the Shuttle. Other than some differences in the battery 
complement, the S6 truss contained solar array wings, a beta gimbal and a PV radiator similar to the P6 
truss segment.  
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Figure 141 – P6 truss in the Payload Canister. 
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S0 Truss/Module-to Truss Structure/Lab Cradle Assembly/Mobile Transporter 
The S0 Truss is the center element of the ISS truss structure  and the hub for electrical power and 
thermal management utilities between the truss segments and the module pattern. It was launched on 
STS-110 on April 8, 2002. The S0 structural certification involved both launch and on-orbit loads as well 
as detailed simulation of the mating event between it and the Lab Cradle Assembly and the structural 
analysis and testing of the Module-To-Truss Structure. 
 The S0 Truss was a dual-keeled, four-trunnion, full-bay payload which underwent static, modal and 
acoustic testing. The static and modal testing was performed at The Boeing Company, Huntington 
Beach, CA. The NASA-JSC Vibration and Acoustics Test Facility performed the acoustic testing in the 
facility’s reverberant acoustic chamber. The S0 truss was subjected to a series of static tests for both 
launch and on-orbit loads.  The tests included static tests to 1.4 x limit load applied through the longeron 
and keel trunnions to simulate ascent loads and an Orbiter trunnion relative displacement load case. 
Launch load cases for the Mobile Transporter interface were also performed. It also included tests to 1.5 
times the  limit, on-orbit loads for a forward strut group and an aft strut group of the Module-To-truss 
Structure, the S0 interface to the Lab Cradle Assembly, the Segment-to-Segment Attach System, the 
Mobile Transporter (MT) Interface, the Power Data Grapple Fixture and the MT emergency stop. Views 
of the finite element models used for test correlation are shown in Figure 142 [72]. 
A modal survey test of the S0 Truss was performed in order to characterize the element for both Shuttle 
transport to orbit and the on-orbit dynamic  environment. This modal test included many mass 
simulators, including the Mobile Transporter structural test article. Since the S0 truss was the central 
structural element that interfaced with the module pattern, fully characterizing the dynamic behavior of 
this element was essential. Once the modal test was completed, mass simulators were replaced with 
acoustic simulators and the test article was shipped to JSC for acoustic testing.  The S0 STA was 
subjected to an OASPL of 141 dB for sixty seconds and passed the test successfully. The S0 flight article 
was not subjected to any structural testing since the design and construction approach was identical to 
the S0 STA. 
In order to interface the S0 Truss with the U.S. Lab, a temporary stowage structure called the Lab Cradle 
Assembly was launched on an earlier Shuttle flight and bolted to the outside of the “Destiny” laboratory. 
It contained a mechanical claw and guides which interfaced with a capture bar and alignment pins on 
the S0 truss. This system, collectively known as the Module-to-Truss Structure Attach System (MTSAS) 
was used to soft-dock the S0 truss to the “Destiny” Laboratory temporarily while the EVA crewmembers 
deployed and fastened the four Module-to-Truss Structure strut groups to provide the permanent 
interface and structural load path to the module pattern. The active half was attached to the Lab Cradle 
Assembly which was mated to both the Aft-Ring and Mid-Ring of the U.S. Lab (Figure 143) [73]. The 
Passive half was attached to S0 (Figure 144) [74]. Both halves of the MTSAS were fit-checked with one 
another prior to launch and, in combination with fit-checks of the MTS hardware, dynamic modeling 
simulations of the mating event, Neutral Buoyancy Lab tests and ground-based deployments of the flight 
hardware, the S0 truss was successfully attached to the ISS. 
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Figure 142 – Views of the S0 finite element model used for modal test correlation. 
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Figure 143 – Active half of the MTSAS. 
 
Figure 144 – MTSAS Passive Half. 
The S0, S1/P1 and S3/P3 trusses were bolted assemblies of machined bulkheads and open cross-sections 
fabricated from aluminum 2219 plate and bar stock. Each member was fastened to each other with 
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multiple bolts. The Module-To-Truss Structure (MTS) struts interfaced with the U.S. Lab through a set of 
EVA installed fasteners integrated to an attach plate on the end of each strut group. These connections, 
once assembled by EVA had to withstand on-orbit dynamic loads as well as pressure and thermal cycling 
for the life of the ISS (Figure 145) [75]. The S0 truss provides a good example of some of the issues with 
designing and analyzing the bolted joints on the ISS. Ensuring the structural integrity of the bolted joints 
across the ISS was a continuous challenge throughout the development phase of the ISS Program. 
 
 
Figure 145 – Module-to-Truss Structure Forward Struts, Lab Cradle Assembly and MTSAS. 
NSTS 08307, “Criteria for Pre-loaded Bolts” was the governing document for analysis of bolted 
connections on the USOS ISS elements. This document presents various methods for preloaded joint 
analysis. Uncertainty factors for applied preload, preload losses due to thermal effects, typical nut 
factors and the recommendation to perform application specific torque tension testing are included in 
this document. Because of the myriad of applications, there were some concerns that the methods in 
this document result in overly conservative joint designs. Also, some of the recommendations for 
preload loss and nut factors may not be applicable to the unique structural designs used in all spacecraft 
applications. The bolted joint analysis criteria was recently revisited by industry experts and a multi-
center team of NASA structural engineers to incorporate ISS lessons learned and develop new, less 
conservative preloaded joint analysis criteria. This will be published as NASA-STD-5020, Requirements 
for Threaded Fastening Systems in Spaceflight Hardware. 
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For the MTS strut interface, the attach bolts between the MTS Structure and the “Destiny” Lab Module 
had to be sized to be installed with the maximum torque available to the EVA crewmembers using the 
Pistol Grip Tool (PGT) and yet still be strong enough to maintain a preloaded joint over the life of the ISS.  
 
Figure 146 – Module-To-Truss structure showing aft and forward strut interface plates. 
The massive EVA assembly task of the ISS (exceeding 150 spacewalks as of 10/28/10) was made possible 
due to the teamwork and extensive upfront engineering to make each on-orbit assembly task friendly to 
the EVA crew. The design challenges for the structural engineers to develop many EVA bolted interfaces 
were complex. Structural analysis taking into account preload uncertainties, tolerances, thermal effects 
and PGT performance were performed for each EVA joint provided ground engineers the data to advise 
the EVA crewmembers to apply higher installation torques, if required, when a bolt could not be seated 
(Figure 146)[76]. In addition to bolted joint analysis, worksite analysis and strategic placement of 
handholds and foot restraints, every removable and replaceable ORU had tolerance analysis performed 
for maximum/minimum material conditions and on-orbit thermal differential to assure that they could 
successfully be removed and replaced on-orbit. Multiple spacewalks have been performed removing 
and replacing ORUs of various sizes and no issues due to installation/removal tolerance mismatch have 
occurred. 
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The S0 truss contained all of the utility trays and umbilicals that distributed power and cooling from the 
primary power and active thermal control systems. A detailed tolerance analysis of the fit of all of the 
Module-to-Truss structure strut groups along with each deployable umbilical tray that was launched 
attached to S0 was performed to assure that the dimensional stack-up of the different on-orbit mated 
interfaces did not exceed the adjustability and compliance that was designed into the various struts, 
fluid lines, electrical lines and mechanical interfaces between the trays and the module pattern. In 
addition, “on-orbit constraints testing” was performed for all electrical and fluid connector and umbilical 
tray connections to be made by EVA crewmembers.  These tests involved exercising the individual 
umbilical trays and connections on the ground prior to launch using simulators to verify to the greatest 
extent possible that the EVA mating of these trays and umbilicals would take place successfully. It was 
during an on-orbit constraints test of one of the S0 to Lab umbilical trays that interference was noted in 
the hinge joint of the tray that would have prevented successful deployment on-orbit. This problem was 
corrected and the tray was successfully deployed during the STS-110 mission. 
The S0 truss was launched to orbit on April 8, 2002 on the STS-110 mission. It was installed on the 
“Destiny” laboratory on April 11, 2002 during the first of four spacewalks performed on that mission to 
perform the myriad of structural and utility line mating operations to attach the truss segment to the 
station. The successful installation of the S0 onto the ISS heralded the beginning of the construction of 
the backbone of the ISS.  
S1/P1 Truss, Thermal Radiator Rotary Joint (TRRJ) and Central Thermal Control System Heat Rejection 
System (HRS) Radiator 
The S1 Truss (and its companion P1 Truss) contains the thermal control system for the ISS. Each truss 
carries three HRS radiators in their stowed configuration, the Thermal Radiator Rotary Joint (TRRJ) 
(provided by Lockheed Martin – Sunnyvale, CA), an Ammonia tank, a Nitrogen tank and a Pump Module 
(one of which was changed out by EVA in August 2010) (Figure 148)[78].  
A static, modal and acoustic test campaign was undertaken on this element, along with a dedicated 
static test on the deployed HRS radiator. The truss element static test was performed at The Boeing 
Company – Huntington Beach, CA. The static test campaign for launch loads was reduced to a single load 
case of 1.4 times limit loads due to schedule and budget constraints. The Segment-to-Segment Attach 
System (SSAS) and the PDGF interfaces were tested to 1.5 x on-orbit limit loads. An excellent discussion 
of the static test is provided in the paper “International Space Station Alpha (ISSA) Starboard Integrated 
Truss Segment 1 (S1) Static Loads Structural Qualification Test – A Recipe for Success” by S. Zimmerman 
and G. Barnett [79]. The modal test campaign included mass simulators for the HRS radiators and TRRJ 
(Figure 149) [80], the ammonia tank assembly (Figure 150) [81], the nitrogen tank assembly (Figure 151) 
[82] and the pump module. A moment of drama occurred after the modal test when the S1 STA was 
being lifted from its test stand for shipment to JSC for the acoustic test. The aft trunnions had not been 
unbolted so the article was lifted by its forward trunnions only during the move operation. The test 
article was inspected and structural analysis performed for this inadvertent load case. No damage or 
overstress condition was indicated. 
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Figure 147 – Umbilical trays represented between S0 truss and the module pattern. 
Major ORU assemblies such as the TRRJ, Pump Module, Nitrogen Tank Assembly and Ammonia Tank 
Assembly were subjected to their own dedicated qualification programs which included pressure, static 
loads, and modal and vibroacoustic tests. The data from the component level tests was included in the 
integrated truss element math models where required (Figure 152) [83]. For example, the TRRJ was 
subjected to component-level protoflight static loads, modal survey and random vibration testing and its 
pressurized components were both qualification and acceptance pressure and leak tested. Government 
Furnished Equipment (GFE) such as the Crew and Equipment Translation Aid (CETA) cart underwent 
component level static loads, modal survey and vibroacoustic tests. The interface to the CETA cart on 
the S1 truss was static tested to launch loads but a CETA cart mass simulator was used during the modal 
Lab to S0 umbilical Tray Lab to S0 
umbilical 
Tray 
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test and an acoustic simulator was used during the acoustic tests. The modal test was performed at the 
Space Shuttle Modal Test Bed at MSFC [84]. 
 
Figure 148 – Schematic of the S1 Integrated Truss Assembly in its launch configuration. 
There was an additional component static test of the deployed Central Active Thermal Control System 
HRS radiator to 1.2 times the predicted limit load. The deployed radiator would be subject to plume 
loads and transient dynamic loads transmitted through the ISS structure from berthing, docking, reboost 
and EVA (Figures 153 [85]and 154 [86]). SSP 30559 required that structures whose primary design loads 
were on-orbit events either are static tested to 1.5 times limit load (ultimate load) on a dedicated test 
article or to 1.2 times limit load for a protoflight unit and be designed with a minimum yield factor of 
safety of 1.25.  
At the Lockheed-Martin facility in Dallas, TX, the HRS radiator was deployed horizontally and offloaded 
from above by a track system. A point load was applied at the end of the radiator to simulate 1.2 times 
the on-orbit load. The radiator base and support structure were instrumented to record loads and the 
deployed radiator was instrumented to record deflections. While the load distribution through the 
radiator structure was well within predicted values, the base stiffness was insufficient to prevent 
excessive lateral deflection of the radiator. The radiator deflected nearly three times more than 
predicted. In the ISS configuration, this excessive deflection would have caused contact between the 
three adjacent radiator ORUs. Based on this test, the radiator base support was redesigned to increase 
stiffness and the test was re-run with acceptable deflections recorded. 
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Figure 149 – Detail of the TRRJ, radiator beam and HRS radiators. 
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Figure 150 – Ammonia Tank Assembly Schematic 
 
Figure 151 – Nitrogen Tank Assembly schematic. 
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Figure 152 – ITS S1 Integrated dynamic math model. 
The acoustic test performed at NASA-JSC exposed the S1 STA to a 141 db OASPL for sixty seconds 
(Figures 155 and 156) [87].  For that test, the flight TRRJ, three flight HRS radiators and the qualification 
pump module, ammonia tank and nitrogen tank ORUs were installed on the S1 STA in order to qualify 
this hardware to the acoustic environment. This test was completed successfully. 
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Figure 153 – Single deployed HRS radiator configuration. 
The S1 truss was successfully launched aboard STS-112 on October 7, 2002 and its companion P1 truss 
was launched aboard STS-113 on November 25, 2002. An imagery survey in early September, 2008 
detected a delamination on the facesheet of one of the HRS radiator panels on the S1 truss (Figure 157).  
The root cause of the anomaly is currently under investigation. 
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Figure 154 – Three deployed HRS radiators on the S1 truss.  
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Figure 155 – S1 STA Acoustic Test Environment (+10% contrast again). 
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Figure 156 - S1 STA acoustic test environment. 
 
Figure 157 – ISS radiator damage on the S1 truss. 
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S3/S4/S5 trusses, Solar Alpha Rotary Joint (SARJ) and Beta Gimbal Assembly (BGA) 
The S3/S4 (and its companion P3/P4) truss elements were a joint effort between The Boeing Company – 
Huntington Beach, CA (formerly McDonnell Douglas, which provided the S3 truss), Lockheed-Martin – 
Sunnyvale, CA (which provided the Solar Alpha Rotary Joint, or SARJ) and The Boeing Company – Canoga 
Park (formerly Rocketdyne) which provided the S4 truss segment. While the S3 segment (including the 
SARJ) had a dedicated static test article, the S4 truss segment was intended to be refurbished as a 
protoflight structure and subsequently flown (Figure 158) [88]. Therefore, the static test cases for the 
Orbiter launch and landing events were only to 1.1 times limit load. The S3/S4 truss element was the last 
in the test series of USOS truss elements so by this time there were several static test campaigns to draw 
the data used to justify this approach. On-orbit interfaces such as the SSAS and the Unpressurized Cargo 
Common Attach System (UCCAS) were tested to 1.5 times limit load.  The static testing as well as a 
modal test for dynamic math model verification was performed at MSFC. The acoustic test to 141dB 
OASPL was performed at NASA-JSC (Figure 159). The S3/S4 acoustic test in 2000 was the last major flight 
element acoustic test performed in that facility. All structural tests were completed successfully despite 
having a large section of the MSFC static test fixture dropped on the S3 truss segment during test set-up. 
Major components of the S3/S4 segment were tested individually. The SARJ STA (Figure 160) [89] was 
subjected to a static and a modal test (Figure 161)[90]. The test results were used to correlate the math 
SARJ math model (Figure 162) [91]. The SARJ was certified in two configurations: a launch configuration, 
where launch locks transmitted the induced loads during the transportation to orbit around the 
mechanism and the on-orbit configuration where the launch locks are removed and the Alpha Joint 
Interface Structure (AJIS) struts are installed via EVA. The SARJ static test campaign included an ultimate 
loads test to both 1.4 times the launch loads and a separate ultimate loads test to 1.5 times the on-orbit 
loads. SARJ on-orbit loading was a combination of mechanical and thermally induced loads, with thermal 
loads being a significant contributor due to the differential stiffness of the AJIS struts with the 
surrounding structure. 
The P3/P4 truss segment was launched to orbit aboard STS-115 on September 9, 2006 with its twin 
S3/S4 truss segment launched aboard STS-117 on March 15, 2007. The SARJs on both elements were 
successfully activated and all four solar array wings were successfully deployed. The starboard SARJ 
began to exhibit wear on its race ring in 2007 which caused excessive vibration to be transmitted 
through the ISS structure. During the STS-126 mission of November/December 2008, EVA crewmembers 
applied lubrication to both SARJ race rings and resolved this problem. 
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Figure 158 – Protoflight structural testing decision package for Rocketdyne (now Boeing-Canoga Park) 
integrated truss elements. 
  
131 
 
 
 
Figure 159 –S3/S4 STA in the NASA-JSC Reverberant Acoustic Chamber.  
S3 
Truss 
Solar Alpha Rotary Joint 
(SARJ) 
S4 
Truss 
Formatted: Font: Bold
132 
 
 
Figure 160 – SARJ STA configured for its component-level modal test. 
 
Figure 161 – SARJ Modal Test Set-up. 
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Figure 162 – SARJ Math Model used for Modal test Correlation. 
The P5 truss (and its companion truss segment S5) was not static tested. Only a modal test was 
performed in the Space Shuttle Payload Modal Test Bed at MSFC to verify the dynamic math model for 
Orbiter and ISS integration. An interesting issue arose during the P5 modal test. Since the struts which 
make up P5 were axial force members, the “play” inherent in each strut installation caused the first 
natural frequency to be slightly different for the same input force. This non-linearity was thoroughly 
scrutinized by the dynamicists responsible for the testing and a verified math model was provided to 
both the ISS and Shuttle Programs with the help of sensitivity studies to define the effects of the non-
linearity. P5 was launched aboard STS-116 on December 9, 2006 and S5 was launched aboard STS-118 
on August 8, 2007. 
The Beta Gimbal Assembly was attached to the IEA through an EVA-deployable four-bar linkage. A 
protoflight static test of the four bar linkage to 1.2 times the predicted on-orbit loads was performed. 
This test was particularly useful when during deployment of one of the BGAs, only three of the four bars 
fully locked in place. Engineers on the ground were able to use the results of the static test to 
demonstrate structural integrity with only three of four linkages seated. 
 
ISS Composite Rack 
Most of the internal equipment and payload hardware for the USOS modules was transported to orbit in 
bookcase-shaped, graphite-epoxy composite racks. Manufactured by The Boeing Company in Huntsville, 
Alabama, these racks were designed to be installed into a pressurized element both on the ground and 
on-orbit. Common interfaces between the rack and the interior pressurized module structure are 
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present within Node 1, Node 2 and Node 3, the U.S. Lab, the Airlock and the MPLM. The H-II Transfer 
Vehicle (HTV) was also designed to accommodate these composite racks. The majority of large 
experiments and critical ISS systems equipment is brought to ISS fully integrated in these racks. Each 
rack is designed to be transported to and from orbit with a requirement for 15 launches and landings 
through its lifetime. Launch and return of some of these racks is via the MPLM. 
With the variety of possible payload and rack equipment configurations, the structural verification test 
campaign had to provide data that would be generic enough to be applicable for verifying a myriad of 
rack applications, and yet be specific to physically-realizable equipment configurations. For example, 
there were four-post and six-post International Standard Payload Racks,  four-post and six-post 
equipment racks, two types of stowage racks which had interfaces with an Aisle Stowage Container, and 
drawer and equipment configurations tailored for each rack application. 
After a great deal of discussion between the rack developers  at Boeing-Huntsville and the ISS and 
Shuttle Program structures teams, a strategy was agreed upon to provide the required static strength 
and dynamic math model verification data for the various racks. The Dash-6 Rack modal survey in both 
fixed-base and free-free configuration included four shelves loaded with various distributed masses 
amongst the shelves. The Dash-4 Rack modal survey was tested in both fixed base and free-free 
configurations with an integrated mass of either 400 kilograms or 700 kilograms concentrated at various 
locations within the rack. Static testing of the Dash-6 Rack was performed to envelope the various 
interface loads for rack transport to and from orbit. The Dash-11 Static Loads test included load cases for 
internal equipment as well as the Aisle Stowage Container. During this static loads test series, the rack 
post failed prior to 140% of limit load.  The Dash-11 rack was determined to be sufficiently similar to the 
Dash-4 rack so that no modal test of the Dash-11 rack was required [92]. 
The rack posts were composite I-beam sections with the shelves attaching to one of the I-beam flanges. 
The inertia loads of equipment attached to the shelves applied a torsion load to the flange/web 
interface that exceeded its structural capability. A test program was undertaken to characterize the 
strength of this interface and assure that the weight of the equipment on the rack shelves would be less 
than this value for all rack applications. After the maximum shelf load was recalculated, the static test on 
the rack post due to shelf loading was performed successfully to 140% of limit load. In addition, the 
buckling calculation for the large curved panel which composed the back of the rack showed that this 
panel could buckle under launch and landing loads. A hat-section stiffener was incorporated into the aft 
panel design, reducing the unsupported length of the aft panel and alleviating this concern. The racks 
have been flown to and from orbit without any issues since 1998 (Figure 163).  
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Figure 163 –Rack being maneuvered into its position inside the Lab Module. 
Other rack hardware has since been developed to provide transportation of payload hardware to and 
from orbit, such as the Resupply Stowage Platform (RSP). This hardware is essentially a plate which ties 
into the rack attach points within the MPLM. Stowage bags filled with soft goods and other equipment 
are strapped to the front and back of the RSPs. The structural verification of this configuration included 
a modal survey and static test as well as detailed characterization of the strap configurations to assure 
that sufficient preload was applied to prevent adjacent bags from contacting during launch. Such 
contact could cause unacceptable load sharing between the platforms. During static testing, excessive 
deflections of the bags were noted which led to the development of fences around each of the bags 
which prohibited load-sharing between adjacent bags during launch or landing.  
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Structural Life Certification Approach 
FLAGRO vs. Fatigue Testing 
The primary tool used to verify the structural life of metallic structures on ISS was FLAGRO (now 
NASGRO), an analysis tool developed by NASA for fatigue crack growth and fracture analysis. SSP 30558 
defined the activities required by the ISS hardware developers to minimize the risk of structural failure 
due to crack propagation.  The on-orbit life of the ISS primary structure was specified as 15 years from 
delivery of the hardware element to orbit. Transient loading events and their accompanying load 
spectra were derived and fracture and fatigue analysis per SSP 30558 was performed on all ISS elements 
to certify the hardware for this 15-year on-orbit service life. All loading events from the time of 
manufacture, including any structural testing, ground transportation and delivery to orbit were 
encompassed by the load spectra used in the structural life analysis. A scatter factor of four based on 
the metallic material fatigue data available was used on the load spectra. 
FLAGRO was used by NASA, JAXA and ESA to perform structural life verification. The Russian 
contributors to the ISS employed fatigue testing to certify the structural life of their elements using a 
scatter factor of 8 for their fatigue testing on the load-bearing interfaces of both the FGB and the Service 
Module. With the proposal to extend the life of the ISS to at least 2020, a structural life extension effort 
is underway comprised of additional NASGRO analysis by NASA, ESA and JAXA, and additional fatigue 
testing by the Russians. On January 14, 2009, anomalous thruster firings during a Service Module 
reboost imparted significant oscillations into the ISS structure. While no immediate structural integrity 
concerns were identified based on analysis of this event, the life extension efforts for the ISS will use all 
loading events measured on the ISS to date using the on-orbit instrumentation as well as prediction for 
future on-orbit loads from visiting vehicle, maneuvers and EVA. 
The NASGRO material database is the analysis program’s greatest strength as well as its biggest liability. 
Since all possible material product forms, heat treatments and crack growth orientations are not 
available in the database, users must make assumptions as to what data is applicable to their particular 
piece of flight hardware. Even when the proper similitude between the database and the flight 
hardware exists, any production lot and/or vendor source variations within the properties are not 
directly accounted for in the database. Since fracture is rarely a design driver for ISS applications 
because of stiffness-driven designs, the low duty cycle usage environment, and positive margins of 
safety for high static strength factors of safety, analysis-only service life predictions using NASGRO can 
be performed.   
Most of the ISS structure is essentially uninspectable once it is assembled. The truss elements are 
wrapped in Multi-Layer Insulation Blankets, the pressurized elements are covered with MM/OD 
protection and the interior of the ISS is filled with racks and stowed equipment. The truss structure is 
highly redundant and designed primary for launch loads and stiffness so the unlikely event of on-orbit 
damage or failure of a truss structural member is not a significant threat to ISS structural integrity. 
External surveys of the ISS using video cameras and during EVA has shown evidence of MM/OD impacts 
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on handrails and other structure and while this damage can pose a sharp edge hazard to EVA 
crewmembers, there has been no threat to the structural integrity of ISS from MM/OD impacts thus far. 
The MM/OD shielding on the majority of the ISS pressurized elements is removable and most of the 
internal pressure walls of the modules can be accessed by folding the racks down or removing 
equipment.  The Module-to-Truss Structure struts can support on-orbit loads with any one strut 
removed.  
The pressure vessels were designed to an ultimate factor of safety of 2.0 to lower the working stresses 
and are leak before burst designs. The Composite Overwrapped Pressure Vessel stress rupture life for 
ISS pressure vessels became a concern when more data became available on graphite-epoxy and Kevlar-
epoxy overwrapped pressure vessels which called the initial service life calculations into question. Since 
NASGRO can only analyze metallic materials and glass, stress-rupture life assessments for COPVs must 
be based on test data.  Therefore, more testing will be done in the coming months to supplement the 
original 1994-1995 stress rupture life data upon which the service life predictions for the ISS pressure 
vessels are based. This is part of the ISS life extension effort since the ISS COPVs were only certified to a 
15-year, on-orbit service life. 
Periodic updates to the NASGRO software are made as more crack growth data is developed. Materials 
used in the Russian Segment of the ISS were tested and analysis was performed by both U.S. and 
Russian structural engineers in order for both sets of specialists to become familiar and comfortable 
with the different approaches to structural life verification. With the challenge of extending the life of 
ISS to 2020 and beyond, all of the latest material data as well as loads predictions from the ISS 
integrated math-model and on-orbit data from accelerometers and strain gages installed on the ISS 
vehicle itself will be used. 
Lessons Learned and Suggestions for Future Spacecraft 
The construction and assembly of the ISS has proven that the world can come together and accomplish 
any task if the commitment of the groups involved is strong enough. This has to be the first lesson of the 
ISS: cooperation among international partners is not only possible, but is indeed, practical and 
necessary. 
Another lesson is that complex aerospace structures can be developed and certified on a limited budget, 
if the proper attention is paid throughout the structural analysis and design process. While it could be 
argued that the protoflight structural test approach was a significant risk to the ISS Program, the 
diligence of the structural designers, analysts and test engineers involved in the development of the 
hardware managed this risk successfully. No major structural failures occurred during the test program 
and the hardware was certified with sufficient margin to appropriately conservative loads to make 
structural life extension of the on-orbit ISS possible. 
Extensive pre-test analysis was performed prior to each structural test and after some initial difficulties 
with the Node 1 pressure test campaign, a Test Design Review (TDR)/ Test Readiness Review (TRR) 
board process was instituted so that all stakeholders could review the objectives, test sequence and 
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configuration of the structural test article and raise any issues early in the structural test development 
process. This approach was fundamental to the success of the ISS and should be employed in all 
spacecraft structural test efforts. 
The amount of effort required to certify the windows on the ISS was not understood by the hardware 
developers at the outset, but once the NASA-JSC and KSC glass experts were involved an excellent 
cooperative relationship emerged between NASA, the U.S. contractors and the International Partners. 
These relationships should be established early so that the particulars of window structural verification 
are understood before the structural verification plan for the entire spacecraft is developed. 
On-orbit pre-integrated structural health monitoring instrumentation should be the standard practice 
for characterizing the on-orbit loads environment for spacecraft. The principal author and his structures 
team fought to keep the accelerometers and strain gages which comprised the Structural Dynamic 
Measurement System (SDMS) pre-integrated on the S0, S1/P1 and S3/P3 truss elements against 
enormous Program pressure to delete them as a cost savings. The data from this instrumentation was 
invaluable in diagnosing and solving the SARJ race-ring damage anomaly which threatened the power-
generation capability of the ISS. Instrumentation packages have been flown to ISS and installed both 
internally (Internal Wireless Instrumentation System – IWIS) and externally (External Wireless 
Instrumentation System – EWIS) by the on-orbit crew, but this has been a significant cost in both dollars 
and EVA and IVA crew time (Figure 164). Instrumentation that is already present when the spacecraft is 
launched is the most cost-effective and technically prudent strategy to gather on-orbit structural 
response data. However, rapid change in the data acquisition system technology over the long life of an 
on-orbit structure could lead to obsolescence concerns with the hardware and the data acquisition and 
transfer modes. 
 
 
Figure 164 – On-orbit structural health monitoring instrumentation locations on ISS as of May, 2011. 
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It is crucial to monitor the condition of facility cranes and scrutinize every lifting operation when flight or 
one-of-a-kind test hardware is involved. The closest thing to a serious mishap involving ISS structures 
occurred during lifting operations with either a failure of a facility crane or a piece of structure was not 
properly unfastened prior to the initiation of a lift. Lifting operations are one of the few operations 
where unrecoverable damage could happen to a flight article structure, so every lift of this kind should 
be viewed as a critical lift, whether or not program or project requirements specify the operation as 
such. 
When performing pressure testing of habitable volumes, take care to include in the structural life 
analysis many more pressure cycles than you would otherwise anticipate. As evidenced by the Node 1 
pressurization history (Figure 165), there will always be more than one or two pressure cycles put on a 
flight unit. Aborted test runs, additional data requirements and the complexity of executing a test 
campaign will all conspire to cause additional loading cycles, so prepare for that in the up-front 
structural life analysis of the hardware. 
The changing on-orbit configuration of the ISS throughout its assembly sequence and with the addition 
of new visiting vehicles such as the ATV, HTV and potential commercial spacecraft required countless 
iterations of analysis for the development of on-orbit loads at each stage of ISS assembly and 
throughout its operational life. For any large complex structure, expect to have a structures and loads 
team throughout development and sustaining engineering. 
 
Figure 165 – Node 1 Pressurization History. 
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When performing pressure testing on habitable modules, pre-test structural analysis of the test 
configuration including the effects of any internal secondary structure needs to be performed. The 
difference between the Node STA and the Node 1 internal outfitting are summarized in Figure 166 [93]. 
The major internal secondary structure in the Node STA caused it to deform symmetrically while the 
empty Node 1 pressure shell deformed asymmetrically due to the effects of its geometry and welding. It 
is recommended that any internal secondary structure that is shown by analysis to pick up a significant 
amount of load due to internal pressure be included in each pressurized element tested. 
Provide adequate time for the structures team to thoroughly analyze the structural test articles prior to 
the initiation of structural testing. Schedule and budget pressure will always be present, but the Node 1 
structural qualification was delayed significantly because of the insufficient number of structural 
analysts and a lack of thorough review of the structural analysis. The delays in the certification of this 
element rippled through the ISS program. The structure may not be the most expensive item in the 
hardware development cycle, but it is often the first, so sufficiently staffing the structural design, 
analysis and test group can avoid significant program impacts. 
The differential thermal effects on on-orbit mating elements are significant. For the PMA mating to 
pressurized elements, a standoff time period of about eight hours was required prior to mating in order 
for its CBM flange temperature to come acceptably close to the temperature of the flange on the mating 
element. Thermal standoffs were incorporated into the CBM design in order to make this operation 
possible. For the truss elements, locked-in thermal loads due to mating two truss elements at different 
temperatures could be so severe, that a flexure was incorporated into the design of the SSAS. Detailed 
thermal analyses was performed for each truss mating operation to assure that the two interfaces were 
within acceptable temperature limits at the time of mating. This issue was a concern for the major 
pressurized elements, but it was somewhat mitigated by the large thermal mass of a pressurized 
element such as a Lab or Node. 
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Figure 166 – Node 1 / Node STA Configuration comparison. 
Often, internal hardware is attached to longeron structures made of machined aluminum plate 
stockwhich loads the material in the short transverse (ST) direction. Material data for both stress and 
fracture analysis for the ST direction of structural forms and material used in these applications typically 
have to be developed by the contractor responsible for the structure at significant expense. A 
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compilation of the ST direction material data that is currently available and an effort to further develop 
and disseminate a database could be a valuable cost-savings measure for future vehicle programs. 
 
Conclusions 
No paper of roughly 21,000 words can do justice to the incredible human effort it took to design, 
fabricate and structurally test the hardware of the ISS. This paper is a feeble attempt at capturing the 
experience, knowledge and lessons learned of those involved for posterity. If the current generation can 
see the ISS in the sky at night and future generations can gain any value by this summary document, 
limited though it is, on the 26-year effort it took to design and fully-assemble the ISS, this enlightenment 
is its own reward. 
I would like to thank everyone who contributed to this paper as well as the many thousands of others 
whose work, though uncredited and eventually long-forgotten, made the construction of the ISS 
possible. Its presence on-orbit is the living tribute to all of you. 
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